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Pay for performance is a method of setting very specific 
performance objectives for individual employees in a company and 
tieing a substantial portion of an employee's compensation to the 
successful achievement of those objectives. Pay for performance 
differs from merit pay plans which have been tied more to job 
standards and less defined, more subjective performance criteria. 
This study is limited to investigating pay for performance 
programs of other companies at the supervisory, manager and officer 
levels with the goal of improving existing Corporate programs. It 
will also be limited to cash compensation, since other forms of 
compensation is a study of considerable magnitude in itself. 
Why look for new, more effective methods of employee 
compensation? Great Falls Gas Company (GFGC) is interested because 
traditional merit pay programs have not achieved what they were 
intended to achieve. Too often the difference between a raise for 
outstanding performance and one for satisfactory performance is not 
enough to influence performance.1 Numerous articles researched in 
this study detailed these problems time and time again, as well as 
tieing into the experience of Great Falls Gas Company's nine year old 
merit pay program. 
The Company adjusts base pay, for each employee, under its 
merit pay program, which is tied to job standards. Performance 
reviews are given to each employee every six months. In addition, it 
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has pay for performance programs for its officers and managers and 
certain other key staff. Last year, the pay for performance concept 
was extended to first line supervisors. 
In the next three to five years, the plan is to have the entire 
workforce on a pay for performance basis. Company management 
believes the pay for performance concept at Great Falls Gas has 
proven very successful by increasing the organization's focus on key 
strategic objectives, by improving corporate effectiveness in 
providing better customer service at lower cost, while maximizing 
returns to shareholders. Great Falls Gas is continually reviewing its 
pay for performance programs to determine effectiveness and to 
make improvements where needed. 
Company management is making a concerted effort in this 
study to determine what other companies are doing in the pay for 
performance arena and what techniques and methods are producing 
the best overall results. 
History of Great Falls Gas Company's 
Salary Program 
The Board of Directors approved the pay for performance 
program for managers, officers and other key staff of Great Falls Gas 
Company in 1982. The reason the Board implemented the program 
was to build a sense of teamwork in the management group, for 
better year to year performance for the shareholder. 
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Great Falls Gas Company also has a merit pay program which 
has been in place since 1979. The salary program at GFGC has 17 
different job grades with entry levels, midpoints and maximums. 
The midpoints of each job grade are compared to industry pay levels 
(obtained from salary surveys) each year, for similar positions. GFGC 
tries to maintain the midpoints of each job grade in line with 
comparable local or regional job positions, but when pay for 
performance incentive pay is included, pay levels for high achievers 
will be above comparable industry position pay for similar size 
companies. If incentive pay is not earned, then base pay will be 
slightly below industry levels. 
During the first four years of the Company's pay for 
performance program, was based strictly on the return on equity 
level earned by the corporation. For the past two years, the program 
was revised to incorporate the setting of specific performance 
objectives for each participant. More aggressive goals have been 
integrated into individual performance objectives each year, which 
have resulted in higher overall organizational effectiveness. 
The company must meet certain return on equity (ROE) levels. 
The program currently begins at 1.25 percent below the Public 
Service Commission's allowed return on equity before any bonuses 
are paid. If this threshold level of return on equity is attained, then 
the other provisions of the plan trigger. If the threshold level of 
return is not met, no bonuses are paid. A copy of the Company's plan 
is included in APPENDIX 1. 
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The GFGC plan at the threshold level of earnings has two 
elements: first, a return on equity of 11.00 percent (1.25 percent 
below PSC Allowed ROE) in the given year must be met to have a 
right to earn 50 percent of the incentive bonus pool; second, a 5 year 
rolling average ROE (5 yr. avg of PSC Allowed ROE) must be met to 
trigger the other 50 percent of the pool. A rolling average is defined 
as the most recent 5-year period, including the current year. If 
these two criteria are met then the employee receives 20 percent of 
the total bonus automatically; the other 80 percent is tied to specific 
performance objectives which are set at the beginning of each year. 
The percentage of achievement of these specific objectives 
determines the actual portion of the pool the individual earns. 
Fiscal years 1987 and 1988 were extremely warm (warmest 
since 1934) and the participants were only eligible for half of the 
bonus in 1987 and none in 1988. There is now a loud chorus of 
participants who want to change the plan to where they can earn at 
least a portion of the bonus despite the actual earnings level of the 
Company. The participants of this plan earned 100 percent of their 
eligible bonus in the previous four years with few complaints from 
the participants about the plan structure. Proposed changes in the 
Company's plans are detailed in the recommendation section of 
Chapter V. 
A year ago the Company extended the pay for performance 
program to first line supervisors. These supervisors control about 
two-thirds of the total workforce. Specific performance objectives 
have been set for each supervisor. Their bonus has been tied 25 
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percent to the same threshold of return on equity in the current year 
as described above and 75 percent to specific performance 
objectives. This latter portion will be paid regardless of what the 
Company's performance is and will be based on the percentage 
achievement of their objectives. 
The above described pay for performance participants are also 
eligible for merit increases in pay, based on how well they perform 
their day to day job duties in relation to their job standards. Merit 
increases ranged from 1.5-3.0 percent for the past year. Because 
Company earnings were so poor, due to all time record warm 
weather through the middle of the second fiscal quarter of 1988, a 
salary freeze was implemented beginning in the last month of the 
second quarter for all supervisors, managers and officers of the 
Company. Supervisors were still eligible for their 75 percent portion 
of their incentive bonus. The salary freeze will stay in effect for 
twelve months or until the earnings of the Company improve, 
whichever is longer. 
Each year the Company updates its strategic plan which defines 
the key results areas it wants management to focus on for the next 
three years. Each department sets goals for the upcoming year based 
on the ongoing corporate goals of the Company, which are: 
1) Improve customer service 
2) Build load on the system 
3) Improve productivity 
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4) Improve employee development and challenges 
Specific performance objectives are then set for each 
participant from department goals and from key results areas 
developed from the strategic plan of the Company. Usually four to 
eight specific performance objectives are established for each 
participant in the program with the employee and his or her 
supervisor agreeing on the final objectives. Currently one quarter of 
the employees (supervisors, managers, officers and key staffers) of 
the Company are included in the pay for performance programs. 
Objectives of This Study 
Management is seeking further information in this study to 
improve the Company's pay for performance program in the 
following areas. Specifically, management wants to know: 
1) To what extent other companies include supervisors, 
managers and officers of their companies in their pay for 
performance programs? What successes and failures have they had 
with their programs? 
2) How other companies structure their specific performance 
objectives, to obtain ideas on how to improve the setting of specific 
performance objectives, within the Company. 
3) What the optimum equivalent percentage of employee's 
base pay should be to provide the strongest motivational tie to 
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performance achievement. 
4) What incentive compensation levels other companies are 
setting for payout in total program funds and for individual 
performance achievement, once performance objectives are met. 
5) Whether other companies are monitoring their pay for 
performance programs to determine their overall effectiveness and 
how they have structured their monitoring systems. 




REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
A review was made from secondary information sources to 
determine the business world's experience with pay for performance 
programs. 
This method was selected because the author was aware of 
several trade journal articles outlining various aspects of success and 
failure of general business salary administration programs and new 
pay for performance approaches. 
An information search was made through the America Society 
for Personnel Administration (ASPA) computer data base, covering 
pay for performance articles published during the past three years. 
This search developed a list of forty articles on incentive pay plans. 
From this list, nineteen of the articles were secured for review, from 
titles of articles and papers which appeared to be more pertinent to 
the study. 
Only one of these articles, which was based on AT&T's 
experience, discussed pay for performance specifically for that utility 
sector. AT&T's pay for performance program was developed to help 
bring them from a regulated, monoply business position to one of a 
highly competitive industry environment.2 Their program consisted 
of two parts, one of a special merit award plan for outstanding 
individual performance and a team incentive plan for unit 
performance. The individual performance program are paid 
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regardless of total corporate performance but the team incentive 
plan is tied directly to corporate performance and all participants 
share equally in the plan payout. Their incentive program cost is 
considered part of average pay when making survey comparisons 
with the market. To establish the fund pools for incentive pay, 
traditional merit pay increases were held and the comparable 
percentage of pay increase was put at risk over a three to four year 
period to establish the incentive pay funds. 
Great Falls Gas Company was more interested in reviewing 
criteria specifically designed for the gas utility industry. It was for 
this reason Great Falls Gas Company set about gathering its own 
information from utilities through an information survey, the results 
are detailed in Chapter IV. 
The following paragraphs contain information on pay for 
performance from secondary information sources such as periodicals, 
published papers, and other studies on pay for performance. 
Motivational Theories and The Tie To 
Pay For Performance 
There is a considerable body of research more than 100 studies 
attesting to the positive effects of setting difficult, as compared to 
easy, performance goals. If managers expect very little from 
subordinates, subordinates are not likely to excel; rather, low 
expectations will tend to be self-fulfilling.3 
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Evidence indicates that the most powerful motivational 
systems are those that provide rewards for good performance, and 
withhold rewards for poor performance.4 
It is not surprising to find numerous case studies and reports 
of lethargy and inefficiency in public sector organizations, opting for 
across the board approach to reward distributions. Lawler has 
pointed out, using pay to motivate improved job performance is not a 
"piker's game". To use pay, to motivate improved performance, it is 
essential that substantial differences exist in the range of benefits 
actually provided.5 
Nash and Carroll, in their book The Management of 
Compensation, cite the results of five early surveys encompassing 
more that 4,700 interventions. Average increases in productivity 
after switching from time-based to output-based pay plans ranged 
from 29 to 63 percent, the median increase being 34.5 percent.6 
More recently, an extensive literature review found that, on average, 
individual incentive plans increased output by 30 percent; group 
incentive plans typically increased output by 18 percent.7 
Additionally, a comprehensive review of productivity 
experiments reported the results of seven studies which examined 
the effects of financial incentives. Results were positive in all cases, 
with performance output increases ranging from 18 to 46 percent.8 
Money as a motivation tool is not a new idea. It can be traced 
as far back as to Julius Caesar who paid special incentives to his 
army for special achievement.9 Later, ships captains received a share 
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of the profits of their voyages. With the emergence of the 
professionally managed corporations, GM implemented the modern 
annual incentive plan in 1918. Incentives spread rapidly through 
dominant companies of the era: in the auto industry first, then the 
steel and chemical industries, and later in retailing. The Great 
Depression put a damper on incentives during the 1930s and 
extended through WWII. Beginning in 1950 with the new tax laws 
which favored stock options and for the next 15 years, the 
combination of annual performance based incentives with an 
effective long term option that linked executive rewards to the 
company's increased stock price provided a strong link of pay to 
performance. 
Pay and performance linkage started diminishing in the mid-
1960s and began a long 15-year downhill slide when Congress began 
amending the stock option and tax codes. In the early 1970s, 
research at Harvard Business School had shown that top management 
bonuses were related more to the size of the firm and to position 
level than to the performance of the company.10 A 1981 article in 
Compensation Review purported to prove conclusively that there was 
no correlation at all between pay and performance.11 
There have been numerous articles published in the past few 
years by Fortune. Business Week and other periodicals, stating that 
many chief executive officers of American corporations had forgotten 
that bonuses were supposed to be paid for output, not input. Many 
CEO's were able to sell their board of directors that they should still 
get their fat bonuses even though their corporate performance was 
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poor. With increased competition from both within the U. S. and 
abroad, boards of directors are not the "easy sell" they were a few 
years ago. Also there has been a chorus of workers screaming the 
"wrongs" of upper managements getting large bonuses while they 
have been required to take decreases in wages and benefits.12 
The magnitude of compensation to motivate management in 
the direction of achieving corporate goals will be discussed in detail 
from the results of the utility survey presented in the next section. 
The necessary magnitude of strong motivational compensation 
found in secondary sources showed that, compensation experts 
generally agree that an incentive payment needs to reach a 
minimum of 15 percent of base pay in order to represent a 
meaningful motivating difference to plan participants.13 
Problems With Most Existing Pay Plans 
Why search for new more effective methods of employee 
compensation? Primarily it is done because traditional merit pay 
programs have not achieved what they were intended to achieve. 
Too often the difference between a raise for outstanding 
performance and one for satisfactory performance is insufficient to 
influence performance.14 
Merit pay systems can break down because of problems with 
the performance appraisal systems on which they are based. In 
practice many merit pay systems fail to consistently fulfill their 
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mission of rewarding superior performance. In fact some merit pay 
plans hinder excellent performance by causing enthusiastic 
employees to become frustrated and disenchanted. 
The three main problems with merit pay administration are: 
1) pay is perceived as being unrelated to job performance, 
2) secrecy of pay is related to perceived inequity; and 
3) the size of the merit increases awarded has been too small 
to positively impact performance.15 
Why is there a perception that compensation is unrelated to job 
performance? One problem is that there is so much time elapse 
between performance and reward that the employee loses sight of 
the relationship. Also, the goals or objectives an employee is 
supposed to accomplish are often unclear and not well defined. 
Another factor is that merit increases are based on other 
factors than performance, such as length of service, the manager's 
view of future potential, or the manager's perceived need to equalize 
pay with peers, where one employee's pay is low compared with that 
of others in the group.16 The performance appraisal is typically an 
undesirable task because the forms often do not describe what the 
employee's duties really are which makes it difficult to properly rate 
the employee's performance, and the employee feels that the ratings 
are too subjective and do not really reflect actual performance. 
While the concept of rewarding outstanding performers with a 
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pay increase appears to be straight forward, in practice it is very 
difficult to implement properly. Most organizations do not have 
enough money for payroll increases in their budgets to pay for 
performance. Companies usually allot each department a set 
percentage for wage increases which limits the amount of raises that 
can be allowed. 
Since most managers are restricted by budget constraints on 
the amount of dollars they have for merit increases in their 
departments, an individual's salary increase often is based on the 
manager's creativity in "backing into" performance ratings to make 
the numbers match up. Often these decisions are arbitrary or 
subjective, which many times enrage and often demoralize the 
workers affected. 
Studies have shown that the average performance appraisal 
scores slowly creep up over time.17 This can be a major factor in 
increasing the average size of the merit increase and causes payroll 
budgets to be higher than budgeted levels. Higher annual ratings 
result from supervisor bias in the performance reviews, giving 
higher scores each year whether performance is improved or not. 
There is also evidence that performance scores vary substantially 
from supervisor to supervisor for the same level of employee 
performance, based on their view of what the ratings should be for a 
given level of performance. 
Employee surveys have shown that employees with high 
appraisal scores believe that their appraisals reflected their true 
performance, and were satisfied with their appraisal from their 
supervisor. On the other hand, those employees who received 
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low supervisory appraisals were dissatisfied with their 
appraisal and felt it did not reflect their true performance. At 
least two conclusions are possible from these results. First, if 
appraisal scores reflect true performance, then employees, 
while dissatisfied, have nothing to gripe about. Second, if 
appraisal scores are not reflective of true performance, then the 
merit pay system is creating undesirable dissatisfaction.18 
Surveys have shown that employees strongly disagree with the 
concept that all employees should get equal pay raises.19 Further, 
many employees appear to believe that supervisors do tend to use 
performance to make pay increase decisions. However, they 
apparently think that the supervisor's evaluations are biased since 
employees do not agree that their performance is reflected in their 
performance evaluation or in their merit pay increase. 
Dissatisfaction with a merit program is not necessarily 
bad. For instance, if it is the poorest performers who are 
dissatisfied with their pay increases and the highest 
performers who are most satisfied, then the system is working. 
In other words, the program is rewarding high performers and 
giving low performers the proper feedback. Low performers 
then have a choice of improving their performance or exiting 
the organization.20 
The Need For New Compensation Plans 
Surveys have indicated that most pay raises are too small to be 
effective, a survey of 2,867 companies conducted by The Wall Street 
Journal in 1979 found that salary increases were too low to motivate 
employees.21 
Pay can be motivating if the increase is large enough in 
relation to an individual's income to result in a significant change in 
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financial condition.22 The number of companies using variable 
compensation below the top executive level is still fewer than 20 
percent. In general, organizations are coming to accept the necessity 
of gearing pay to performance and giving employees a "cut" of the 
extra value they produce. 
There are many other important reasons why almost any 
business today needs to implement a more effective compensation 
program. Companies that manufacture products competing with 
foreign products at home and abroad must continually strive to 
reduce their cost of production to be more competitive. The market 
place is very dynamic with shorter product life cycles a firm requires 
a continual analysis of strategic direction, and, to be successful, an 
organization must be able to change quickly with changing market 
conditions and customer demands. 
Utility management today, despite a natural monopoly position, 
too, must be more aggressive to adapt to change. Day to day 
business transactions have become much more dynamic and complex 
with deregulation of gas supplies; more competition from other 
energy sources, especially industrial loads; customer by-pass by 
other gas suppliers; and more stringent demands from customers, 
employees, regulators and stockholders. 
A prime way to gain flexibility to successfully deal with this 
new world is through the development of an effective compensation 
program, which leads management and the company as a whole in 
the direction of strategic goals. An effective program which ties pay 
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to performance can be the answer to many of these organizational 
needs. 
Is The Current Generation of Pav For Performance 
Plans Producing Better Results? 
Consultant and academic research is beginning to point to a 
greater correlation between pay and performance. Recent studies by 
K.R. Murthy's (updated) PhD thesis23, a Hay Associates study24 and a 
recent study by Kevin Murphy of the University of Rochester25 found 
total compensation positively related to corporate performance as 
measured by shareholders' total return.26 
With the decline in the cost of living, compensation increases 
began to slow perceptibly in 1984, a trend that is likely to continue 
throughout the balance of the 1980s. Developments in the long term 
incentive area are also encouraging and bear witness to the viability 
of the pay for performance ethic. There is a renewed interest in 
stock options and the emergence of a second generation of 
performance unit plans. The latter reflects a more sophisticated 
understanding about the nature of performance measures that 
influence stock price performance, such as return on stockholders' 
equity. 
The previous paragraphs contain discussion on the pros and 
cons of pay for performance programs. The following is a summary 
of the generally argued pros and cons of pay for performance 
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programs, as described by Mr. Thomas Rollins, PhD, Hay Management 
Consultants.27 
Advantages: 
1) Money can serve as an extremely effective motivator of 
employee performance. 
2) Superior employees resent automatic and indiscriminate 
pay increases for all. 
3) Tying pay to performance puts teeth in the performance 
appraisal process. 
4) Good pay for performance programs increase clarity of 
employee goals. 
5) Pay for performance programs can give organizations much 
greater mileage for their compensation dollar. 
6) Good pay for performance programs increase employees' 
sense of ownership and involvement in overall company 
performance. 
7) Pay for performance systems are conducive to a "no 
surprise" policy of performance evaluation. 
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8) Pay for performance programs encourage employees to 
track their own performance against pre-established 
targets, thus creating a sense of challenge to improve levels 
of work efficiency. 
Disadvantages: 
1) Many employees are of a mind set where they prefer the 
security and guarantee of automatic increases. 
2) Most pay for performance programs reward individual 
performance which is counter to establishing team efforts. 
3) The need to generate tailored goals and measures that go 
beyond just budget numbers exceeds the capacity of many 
organizations to manage. 
4) Employees view pay for performance not as a way of 
stimulating performance, but to contain compensation. 
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CHAPTER in 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Great Falls Gas, in order to obtain specific information on gas 
utility programs conducted a mail and telephone survey of seventeen 
gas utility companies with pay for performance programs. The 
survey was conducted during the period of April 15 to May 13, 1988. 
A summary of the responses to each survey question and a list of 
companies which furnished information on their pay for performance 
plans are included in APPENDIX 2 at the back of this report. 
Participating companies surveyed are included in APPENDIX 3. 
It was decided not to do a random sample of companies 
because the Company was not interested in what a typical gas 
utility's pay for performance program design contained. But instead 
the study was designed to gather information from utilities with 
successful pay for performance programs. 
A nineteen question survey form was developed by Great Falls 
Gas Company and was tested in-house with the human resource 
department checking it for completeness and clarity. A copy of the 
survey cover letter and survey questionnaire are included in 
APPENDIX 4. 
A threshold level of companies with under $140 million in 
revenues was first selected from the American Gas Association's 
(AGA) member list of those responding to its 1987 Executive Salary 
Study indicating they had a management incentive program. These 
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companies were first selected because it was believed that smaller 
gas utilities pay for performance programs might be more 
appropriate to Great Falls Gas Company than the larger utilities 
programs. Their were only nine utilities of 69 included in the AGA 
Salary Study having under $140 million in revenues, which indicated 
they had incentive bonus pay programs.28 
Because only nine utility companies were found to be included 
in the first group, under the revenue criteria selected, AGA provided 
eight additional company names which they indicated had successful 
management incentive programs. These companies were larger, all 
having revenues over $500 million. 
Of the survey forms sent to these seventeen companies, only 
three completed questionnaires were received by the two week 
deadline. Telephone calls were made to each utility; the majority 
said they would like to have another form sent to them because they 
had misplaced the first one. After one month only four forms had 
been returned. All four were filled out describing their merit pay 
plans instead of their pay for performance programs. In checking 
back, the person who filled out the forms was someone unfamiliar 
with their upper management pay for performance program. 
At this point a telephone survey was made of all seventeen 
utilities on the original lists, using the survey form as the outline for 
the questions. Virtually all useable survey information obtained was 
from the telephone interviews with key human resource personnel 
of each company. If the initial telephone contact found that the 
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individual was not knowledgeable about their company's pay for 
performance program, follow up contacts were made until the person 
with such knowledge was interviewed. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SURVEY RESULTS 
The telephone survey concluded with eleven companies 
furnishing information on their plans. Two companies indicated they 
currently did not have pay for performance programs. The other 
four companies did not choose to participate for one reason or 
another. The information in this study is from those eleven 
completed surveys. Because there was no random sample of utilities 
made and because a small sample was used no statistical analysis 
was attempted. 
Summaries of responses for each survey question are included 
in APPENDIX 2. The following paragraphs are summaries of the 
survey responses. 
Major Reasons for Establishing Pay 
For Programs 
According to survey results, utility companies established their 
pay for performance programs for the following major reasons: 
1) to direct the management of the company to focus on key 
results areas of the company, to improve bottom line 
performance. 
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2) to build team effort to improve performance. 
3) to help change the direction of the 
organization with a constantly changing business 
environment. 
4) to enhance the ability to retain and attract talented 
employees. 
5) to link pay to performance. 
The surveyed companies have had their pay for performance 
programs from one to fifteen years, with the median program age at 
5 years. 
The common thread of almost all surveyed companies was that 
they are attempting to enhance their existing programs or enlarge 
their pay for performance programs to cover a larger portion of the 
management team. 
Threshold Pavout Criteria 
Eight of the eleven companies responding to the survey use a 
combination of group and individual performance objectives. Two 
responding companies have group pay for performance programs. A 
group plan is one where all plan participants share in the pool funds 
in proportion to their base salary, regardless of their individual 
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performance. There appeared to be less enthusiasm for this type of 
program by its users than with programs where individual 
achievement was the basis for allocating incentive pool funds. 
All responding companies used a threshold level of earnings, 
usually return on equity (ROE), to earn at least 50 percent of the 
incentive fund pool. This target must be met before the remainder 
of the plan is available for possible payout. Once the threshold level 
is met, most companies rely on specific performance objective 
achievement by each plan participant to distribute the pool of 
incentive funds. 
Some Companies use other threshold criteria than ROE, they 
are: 
Profit Plan Returns Controllable Operation and 
Peer Group Rankings Maintenance Expenses 
Return on Assets Employees/Customer Ratios 
Retail Rate Comparisons With Peer Group Companies 
Companies who use earnings as the threshold, used various 
criteria as mentioned above, but the two most popular methods 
were: 
1) Comparing actual returns of the company with the 
allowed rate of return set by the governing regulatory 
authorities. This return in most cases was the ROE, but if 
the company had other companies under its ownership 
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umbrella, it likely used return on assets. 
2) Comparing actual returns with a pre-approved profit 
plan or budget. 
Minimum payouts (about 50 percent) in many plans begin 
when 80-85 percent of the return level set as the target objective is 
achieved and usually 100 percent payout is available for distribution 
when 100 percent of the target is achieved. Most plans also payout 
110 to 150 percent of target incentive if higher levels of earnings 
above the target are reached. 
Peer group rankings were used by three larger surveyed 
companies, to determine threshold payouts. Two of the companies 
used their 10 strongest competitors to compare their ROE to and then 
ranked themselves from 1 to 10. The higher they rank with their 
peer group companies, the higher their bonus pool payout. 
One surveyed company ranked itself with peer group 
companies by comparing its retail gas rates with peer companies in 
the region for determining 30 percent of its threshold payout. 
Another popular tool was to use budgeted controllable 
operation and maintenance expenses as the target and setting payout 
beginning at zero percent payout at budgeted levels and with higher 
payouts as expense levels were actually reduced. Comparing actual 
results with budgeted figures seemed to be most popular for 
companies who may be part of a larger unit. However, it is more 
difficult to determine actual return on equity, on a meaningful basis. 
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One fast growing utility, included in the survey, used the ratio 
of employees per customer as the criterion for part of their threshold 
payout. Evidently their management believed that this was a key 
element to their success. It was a new program, so insufficient 
history was available to test its effectiveness at this point in time. 
Virtually all of the companies surveyed had a threshold level 
of earnings or return that must be earned before incentive bonus 
payout. No matter how hard management worked, or met other 
goals, if the shareholder did not do well, from an earnings standpoint, 
then, plan participants did not benefit. Some respondents indicated 
there were complaints from their utility management that they have 
too many factors affecting earnings beyond their control. Examples 
include the weather, regulatory climate, and so forth. They indicated 
their Boards look at these factors similarly to private business risks, 
such as competition, product obsolescence, the economy, and so forth. 
All businesses have risk of earnings loss, and aggressive 
management must find ways to insulate the corporation from those 
risks, utilities included. 
Weightings Between Overall Corporate Performance 
Criteria and Individual Performance 
Companies assigning a percentage weighting factor to overall 
corporate goal achievement and to individual performance objective 
achievement, in general, assign a higher percentage of weighting to 
overall corporate performance to individual positions higher in the 
corporate chain of command. The stated reason for this assignment 
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is that the broader an individual's responsibility in an organization, 
the better the understanding of corporate goals and the individual's 
ability to control the overall achievement of corporate goals. 
Many plans in the surveyed companies have nearly 100 
percent of their incentive compensation payout for the CEO and other 
top officers tied to overall corporate performance. As the 
organizational ladder is descended a smaller percentage of incentive 
payout is tied to overall corporate performance and a higher 
percentage is tied to individual performance, once threshold criteria 
are met. Utilizing this technique allows the pay for performance 
program to stay within the bounds of controlling goal achievement 
by the individual participant. 
Eight of the eleven companies participating in the survey set 
individual performance objectives for each plan participate to 
determine how pool funds are distributed, once threshold criteria are 
met. Threshold criteria establish the level of pool funds available. 
What criteria and methodology are used to establish individual 
performance objectives? This is usually done from the top down in 
the organization where the CEO, top officer group, and/or the Board 
of Directors of the organization establishes overall corporate 
objectives. These objectives are assigned to the appropriate senior 
executives of the organization. Senior executives, in turn, set the 
objectives of officers and managers reporting to them, which, when 
accomplished, will result in overall goal achievement. This process 
goes down the organizational line as far as needed to achieve the 
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goal. 
Actual goal achievement is reviewed and certified by the 
reporting chain of command within the organization. In some 
companies there are senior officer or board compensation 
committees which review and certify all goal setting to make sure 
goals are set aggressively enough and in the right direction at the 
beginning of the plan year. They may also certify that the goals have 
been achieved at the end of the plan year, prior to payout. 
Great Falls Gas Company has their outside auditors certify that 
the payouts are made according to the plan, when they complete 
their year end audit of the Company. 
It is important to set clear, meaningful individual performance 
objectives. Many of the companies surveyed stated that improving 
the process of establishing individual performance objectives was an 
on-going high priority for plan effectiveness. 
Many surveyed companies have target levels of performance to 
be achieved. If targets are surpassed, most plans payout more than 
100 percent for those individuals. One plan allowed a 250 percent of 
payout to the individual exceeding target levels of performance. 
Other plan participants who do not meet target levels, usually must 
reach set threshold levels of performance before any payout is made. 
These levels are usually at least 80-85 percent of target levels to 
trigger a 25-50 percent payout. 
Individual performance objectives are reviewed by the 
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individual achiever as frequently as necessary. Individual objectives 
are always reviewed by superiors at the end of the plan year to 
determine objective achievement. Flexibility was built into most 
plans surveyed, to allow for changes in goals during the plan year, as 
necessitated by a change in corporate goals. 
Individual goal achievers continuously assess factors affecting 
the need to change the direction of certain goals. If corporate 
strategy is changed at the top of the organization, this will likely 
necessitate the need to change individual performance objectives 
down the line immediately in order to achieve the new direction 
objectives. Adjustments are allowed by most plans to be made to the 
individuals affected by the change so they will know what they will 
have do to meet the new payout criteria and time frames. Also, 
usually some allowances are made for partial goal achievement on 
the original goals. 
Most plans contain a very important feature in setting 
individual specific performance objectives, namely, to weight each 
objective based on its importance. Several surveyed companies 
indicated without weighting a participant may concentrate on the 
easier objectives and leave critical objectives till last. This can also 
be handled in an alternate way by assigning a completion date to 
each objective. This latter approach can be enhanced further by 
assigning a weighting to each objective (they must all add to 100 
percent), so that a higher percentage of total payout is assigned to 
the more critical goals and therefore a higher level of effort is put 
forth to achieve those objectives. Approximately half of the 
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surveyed companies use the weighting approach. 
Most companies using individual performance objectives, set 
from four to eight specific objectives for each plan participant. One 
company suggested that only two or three objectives be set for lower 
level managers and supervisors so that they can focus on the 
objectives better. The fewer objectives that can be set and still get 
the job done appears to be the better way to set objectives because it 
is easier to focus on a few rather than many. Examples of specific 
performance objectives are shown in APPENDIX 5. 
Level of Plan Pavout Required to Adequately 
Motivate Participants 
The surveyed companies had wide variations in the amount of 
cash compensations for payout. The lowest was 6 percent and the 
highest was 50 percent of base pay for target goal achievement. The 
higher the participant's position in the organization, the higher the 
payout percentage of base pay for target level achievement. Because 
of the small size of the sample and the wide variation of payout 
levels reported, no attempt was made in this survey analysis to come 
up with an average payout level 
Larger companies usually had much higher individual target 
payout potentials than smaller companies. This is demonstrated 
below from AGA salary survey information gathered in the 1987 
survey. The chart is a plot of key executive positions of all 99 
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companies reporting in the survey against 66 smaller companies 
with revenues under $500 million per year. Detailed summary 
tables from the AGA salary survey are included in APPENDIX 6. 
FIGURE 1 
A Comparison Of Pay For Performance 
Payout Percentages All AGA Companies 
Vs. Smaller AGA Member Companies 
(Under $500Million in Annual Revenues) 
30 
• All Co.s 
ES Less500M Rev. 
CED COO TLegal CTO GEE ffi Mkt 
Officer Title 
Source: 
The 1987 AGA Executive Salary Survey of Member Companies. 
Note: 
Officer Titles-Chief Ex. Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Officer (COO), 
Top Legal Officer (TLegal), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Top Gas 
Supply Executive (GSE), Human Resource Executive (HRE), and Top 
Marketing Executive (Mkt). 
Plans included in the AGA study were designed to trigger 
payout at target levels. The smaller companies survey showed that 
for lower level executives the payouts in the 10-12 percent of base 
pay range for target achievement, while in the larger companies they 
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were slightly higher at 15 percent. These lower payout percentages 
for target goal achievement were for the marketing executives and 
increased to 15 percent for CEO's of smaller companies. They 
reached near 30 percent for CEO's for the group containing the larger 
companies. 
The AGA survey results, including the larger companies, show a 
larger spread of target payout levels between the CEO and other 
executives than did the smaller company group. 
Have Pav For Performance Programs Accomplished 
There Corporate Objectives? 
In general, survey respondents believe that their pay for 
performance program is a strong tool in helping achieve corporate 
objectives and that if the program is designed properly, it stretches 
individual performance in the direction of corporate objectives. The 
"proof of the pudding" as stated by one plan coordinator, is when 
their industry is having difficulty in achieving satisfactory results 
but the company with a solid pay for performance program is doing 
well, that is, they are "bucking the trend." There were two surveyed 
companies which fit this category. 
One company with a strong pay for performance program has 
reduced its workforce by 40 percent even though it is adding 10-15 
thousand new customers each year and has not been before 
regulatory authorities to seek rate relief since 1982. That was the 
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year they implemented their pay for performance program. 
There is broad belief by companies who have pay for 
performance programs that it has helped their organizations to 
better focus in on corporate objectives and has improved individual 
participant's performance. Also, by tying compensation to overall 
corporate objectives it builds team work. It rewards participants for 
a job well done, especially when tied to individual performance 
objective achievement. 
There is a wide spread feeling by plan participants in 
companies not doing well financially that their plans need beefing up 
or changed even though they may acknowledge that their segment of 
the industry as a whole is not doing well at the present time. 
Also if plan participants feel that a certain part of their plan 
compensation is out of their control, they believe that the plan is 
unfair and needs changing. As an example, one company had part of 
its threshold criteria tied to comparing its gas rates with peer group 
rate levels. It had not paid off since plan's inception. Consequently, 
there was a strong feeling by participants, that the criterion was not 
fair and that it needed changing. 
Maior Problems with Pay For 
Performance Programs 
It appears from survey respondents that the designers of pay 
for performance programs should try to keep them as simple and 
straight forward as possible. If it is not clear to the plan participants 
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exactly how the plan works, there becomes suspicion and discontent 
with the plan. 
One company surveyed had an elaborate formula that included 
the factors for threshold, group factors, individual goal weighting, 
and job ranking factors all plugged into the formula. The human 
resource manager responding to the survey gave his program a high 
rating for design and a much lower rating for effectiveness because 
of the lack of understanding of how the program works by most plan 
participants. 
It seems clear from survey respondents that the more 
complexities a pay for performance program contains in its design 
the larger the on going communication effort required to satisfy the 
questions and understanding of the plan participants. 
A second important problem with performance programs is the 
need to design effective, quality goals for individual achievement. 
This was mentioned several times in the survey, especially by 
respondents who were in the first year or two of the plan. It takes 
careful thought to construct an effective individual performance goal 
which is viewed as achievable by the plan participant but, yet, 
requires the employee to stretch his performance above levels 
previously achieved. Difficulty in setting specific performance 
objectives for individuals was not mentioned as often by plan 
respondents whose plans had been in service for several years. 
Several respondents to the survey indicated that goals were too 
easy to achieve in the early phase of the program. They also 
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indicated that if this happens it is important to correct it quickly 
because plan participants can view the incentive awards as 
entitlements after receiving them for a few years without having to 
appreciably stretch their performance for them. 
Another problem when program design leaves allocating all or 
part of the awards to the CEO or the Board based on their views of 
how the employee performed. Views can be very subjective. One 
large company responding to the survey had 25 percent of the 
incentive bonus left to the discretion of the CEO based on his 
judgement of how each participant performed. The practice was 
viewed as unfair by some plan participants. Other survey 
respondents also indicated that a program is more effective if 
individual goals are clear, so that the participant knows exactly what 
he has to accomplish to achieve his goal. 
Two companies indicated problems with first line supervisors 
and lower middle management plan participants who did not relate 
well to corporate goals. Both did not believe they were getting the 
stretch in performance from these groups. Some were leaning 
toward having fewer individual objectives for lower level managers 
so that they might better focus on their objectives. Another 
respondent thought that the payout level was too low for lower level 
managers to provide the proper motivation toward the goals. One 
company was going to have focus groups of plan participants to 
determine the strengths and weaknesses of the plan. The plan would 
then be redesigned to consider overcoming the weaknesses. 
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One company indicated that because its plan included only job 
grades eleven and higher, they had a lot of requests to raise grade 
ten positions to grade eleven so they could be included in the plan. 
The company solved this problem by setting policy where all job 
grade changes from ten to eleven had to be approved by the CEO. 
Overall, survey respondents were more likely to rate their pay 
for performance programs high if corporate objectives were being 
met and plan payout was occurring. Companies which were not 
doing well financially, in most cases, found respondents indicating 
major problems with the structure or administration of the program. 
Do Companies Design Their Own Pav 
For Performance Programs? 
Five of the eleven companies responding to the survey 
developed their own programs, usually after visiting with other 
companies as to how their programs were structured. Two 
companies used consultants to design their programs and four used a 
combination of company personnel and consultants. Even where 
consultants were used to design a company's program, the company 
has used in house expertise to refine and upgrade the program 
during the years of use. All survey respondents were in the process 
of refining some aspect of their pay for performance programs; it 
appears from the survey that pay for performance programs require 
continual honing to make them work effectively under changing 
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conditions. 
None of the companies responding to the survey has a formal 
auditing program to test the effectiveness of their pay for 
performance programs. The two companies which compare their 
bottom line performance with peer group companies indicated that 
their standing in the ranking with peers was the true test as to 
whether their programs were effective or not. One of these 
companies was ranked very high with peers and thought its 
performance plan was working very well. The other company was 
not ranked near the top with peers and thought its program was not 
working. 
One responding company has a group of senior officers review 
the goals of each participant and they follow goal progress from goal 
reports. This helps them keep on track with corporate objective 
achievement and improves the quality of individual performance 
objectives. 
There was only one respondent that indicated having a 
problem selling the concept of pay for performance to regulatory 
authorities. The PSC would not buy the concept that incentive 
awards which were based on current year ROE, was a known and 
certain quantity, even though incentive pay had been earned four 
years in a row by plan recipients. In the most current rate 
application the regulatory authority has challenged the company to 
set up an auditing program so it can be demonstrated how the pay 
for performance program is benefitting the ratepayer. 
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One company used the consulting firm which designed their 
program as an expert witness to sell the program to the Commission. 
Other respondents indicated that there was no problem because it 
was relatively easy to sell the Commission on the concept that tieing 
pay to performance enhances overall effectiveness and is the "best 
bang for the buck" for the consumer. Three respondents indicated 
that had yet to test their incentive pay for performance programs 
with their regulatory authorities. 
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CHAPTER V 
STUDY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
The following conclusions are drawn from research and reflect 
the experiences-both good and poor-of other companies and their 
pay for performance programs. They also serve as guidelines for 
GFGC 
1.) Sending out survey forms to selected companies to gain 
information is not an effective method of collecting data about 
successful pay for performance programs. The telephone survey, 
which Great Falls Gas Company ended up using, is a very effective 
method to collect this information. It is important that the most 
knowledgeable individual about pay for performance is contacted to 
gain the most reliable information. In this case it was the human 
resource manager or officer of each company. 
It is believed that a sufficient number of other company's pay 
for performance programs were reviewed to gain the knowledge to 
effectively update Great Falls Gas Company's pay for performance 
program. 
2.) This study confirmed the importance of the need of utility 
management, today, to adapt to change. A prime way to gain 
flexibility to successfully deal with this changing world is through 
the development of an effective compensation program, which leads 
management and the company as a whole in the direction of strategic 
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objectives. An effective program which ties pay to performance can 
be the answer to many of these organizational needs. 
Consultant and academic research is beginning to confirm that 
a greater correlation between pay and performance is occurring 
more frequently throughout the business world today than just a few 
years ago. 
Gas utility companies reported the following advantages of 
their pay for performance programs: 
a. Directs management focus on key results areas of the 
company, which will improve bottom line performance. 
b. Helps build team effort to effective corporate performance. 
c. Helps an organization change directions rapidly, which is 
critical in a constantly changing business environment. 
d. Assists in the ability to retain and attract talented 
employees. 
e. Is a program, if designed and implemented correctly, links 
pay to performance. 
3.) Approximately 40 percent of the utilities reporting in the 
1987 AGA Salary Survey had pay for performance programs, at least 
for their officers and many including middle managers and 
supervisors. As company size decreases, fewer companies have such 
programs. 
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It was not found that smaller companies, similar in size to 
GFGC, had tailored programs more suitable to GFGC, as originally 
hypothesized. Smaller companies had more modest pay for 
performance programs, which in many cases appeared to be less 
effective in motivating participants. Larger companies had better 
designed plans, which produced better overall results. 
Great Falls Gas has had a program since 1982 and sees no 
logical reason why other small, as well as larger utilities, should not 
have such programs. The same proportional benefits should accrue 
to small utility shareholders, as well as to larger ones from pay for 
performance programs. 
4.) A common thread of almost all surveyed companies was 
that they are looking to enhance their existing programs or enlarge 
their pay for performance programs to cover a larger portion of the 
management team. Three companies surveyed are looking to expand 
pay for performance to their entire work force in the next three 
years. 
5.) All companies surveyed used threshold criteria tied to 
overall corporate performance to determine the amount of funds 
available in the payout pool. Threshold criteria was usually tied in 
large part to return on equity in some manner. 
Companies who use earnings as the threshold used various 
criteria but the two most popular methods were: 
A. Comparing actual returns of the company with the Allowed 
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Rate of Return set by the governing regulatory authority. This 
return was in most cases was ROE, but if the company had other 
companies under its ownership umbrella, it may use return on 
assets. 
B. Comparing actual returns with a pre-approved profit plan or 
budgeted controllable expenses. 
Minimum payouts (about 50%) in many plans began when 80-
85 percent of the return levels set as the target objective are 
achieved and usually 100 percent payout is available for distribution 
when 100 percent of the target is achieved. Most plans also payout 
110-150 percent of target incentive if higher levels of earnings 
above target are reached. 
6.) Over half of the companies responding to the survey 
assigned a percentage weighting factor to overall corporate goal 
achievement and part to individual performance objective 
achievement. In general, they assign a higher percentage of 
weighting to overall corporate performance to positions higher in the 
corporate chain of command. The reason for this assignment is that 
the broader an individual's responsibility, the better understanding 
of overall corporate objectives, and the more direct influence he has 
in the overall achievement of corporate objectives. 
7.) Many plans in the surveyed companies have nearly 100 
percent of their incentive compensation payout for the CEO and other 
top officers tied to overall corporate performance. As the 
organizational ladder is descend, a higher percentage of payout is 
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tied to individual objective achievement, and a lesser amount to 
overall corporate performance. 
8.) It is important that all participants in the program realize, 
that the company must perform well before individuals can do well. 
This brings home the realization that it is bottom line results that 
count for payoffs and not just working hard without looking ahead to 
the benefits to the total organization. Said another way it is "output 
that counts, not input." 
Several respondents indicated that there were numerous in-
house discussions that utilities were different because utility returns 
are tied to weather, while other types of businesses were not. It 
appears that utility Boards are not "buying the argument" that 
utilities are different because all plans surveyed were tied to 
threshold earnings levels. 
Several respondents indicated that their Board's views were 
that utility earnings can be somewhat insulated from severe weather 
impacts by proper design of rates, aggressively seeking industrial 
loads, which are not weather sensitive, plus diversify into businesses 
with non-weather sensitive earnings. 
9.) The methodology used to establish individual performance 
objectives usually starts from the top of the organization down. The 
CEO, top officer group, and/or Board of Directors of an organization 
establishes overall corporate objectives. These objectives are then 
assigned to the appropriate senior executives of the organization. 
Senior executives in turn set the objectives of officers and managers 
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reporting to them and so on down the line to the level necessary for 
goal achievement. 
The success of pay for performance is no doubt dependent on 
the setting of corporate objectives in the direction which will produce 
effective results. If ineffective corporate objectives are established 
and achieved the outcome will be still be unsatisfactory. This 
emphasizes the importance of sound strategic planning in order to 
establish effective corporate goals. 
10.) It is important to set clear, meaningful individual 
performance objectives. For good motivation, it is also important 
that plan participants buy into their performance objectives. They 
should believe they are achievable and are worthy of achievement. 
All companies surveyed, stated that improving the process of 
establishing individual performance objectives was an on-going high 
priority for plan effectiveness. Companies were more comfortable 
writing performance objectives after the plan had been in effect for 
several years. Companies with new plans showed more concern 
about writing effective individual performance objectives. 
Another very important feature in setting individual specific 
performance objectives is to weight each objective based on its 
importance. Without weighting, a participant may concentrate on 
those more easily attained, and, perhaps, less important, until last. 
Designers of pay for performance programs should try to keep them 
as simple and straight forward as possible. If it is not clear to the 
plan participants exactly how the plan works, there becomes 
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suspicion and discontentment with the plan. 
11.) One of Great Falls Gas Company's prime questions going 
into this study was: Are payout levels for its own plan participants at 
a high enough level to get them to stretch their performance? 
Company lower level managers and officers are at a payout level of 6 
and 7.5 percent of base pay respectively. Both secondary research 
and the gas utility survey results pointed towards minimum payouts 
at the 12-15 percent of base pay levels to adequately motivate plan 
participants. 
CEO's incentive compensation levels were in the range of 25-50 
percent of base pay and most plans tapered the incentive bonuses 
down for lower job grades to the minimum levels indicated above. 
Larger companies usually set higher incentive bonuses as a percent 
of base pay than smaller companies. It is not clear from this study 
why this latter phenomena occurs because smaller companies have 
lower base pay for comparable job title positions than larger 
companies. Lower base pay would result in smaller dollar payout 
even by setting the same percentage of base pay. 
Several responding companies indicated that in determining 
the reasonableness of an individual's salary level with the 
marketplace, incentive pay is added to base pay in making such 
comparisons. Base pay with incentive pay should be a minimum of 
5-10 percent above comparative marketplace midpoint base 
compensation levels to have an effective program. Base pay without 
incentive pay will usually be 5-10 percentage points below midpoint 
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market salary levels. 
The cost or payout of an effective corporate pay for 
performance program usually ranges from 5-10 percent of total 
payroll. This is only paid in good earnings years because payout is 
based on meeting set earnings threshold criteria. 
12.) A problem with pay for performance programs which 
leaves the allocation of all or part of the individual performance 
awards to the CEO or the Board, based on their view of how the 
employee performed, can cause suspicion by plan participants 
because the decision is subjective. 
It is better to have all performance criteria clearly defined so 
that plan participants know exactly what has to be done in order to 
achieve payout. 
13.) Two survey respondents indicated problems with first 
line supervisors and lower middle management plan participants not 
relating well to corporate goals. Both did not believe they were 
getting the improvement in performance from these groups to the 
extent of justifying incentive bonuses actually paid. To try to correct 
this situation companies are leaning toward fewer individual 
objectives, two to four, for lower level managers, so that they might 
better focus on their objectives. Another respondent to the survey 
thought that the payout level set for first line supervisors was too 
low and suggested raising it to at least 10 to 12 percent of base pay. 
Since lower level supervisors frequently have a larger part of 
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their overall job responsibilities tied to routine work, many 
companies use their more established merit pay and job standards 
systems to evaluate performance in addition to setting incentive 
bonuses for specific performance objective achievement for this 
group. 
14.) None of the companies responding to the survey have 
formal auditing programs to test the effectiveness of their pay for 
performance programs. Two companies think the use of peer group 
rankings of ROE is a true test on program effectiveness, i.e., if they 
rank high its working and vice versa. 
15.) Great Falls Gas was the only company included in the 
survey statistics that indicated having a problem selling the concept 
of pay for performance to regulatory authorities. 
Recommendations 
After reviewing the results of the secondary research findings 
and the gas company's utility information survey, it appears that 
Great Falls Gas has good basic design of its pay for performance 
program. It has clear threshold criteria, based on ROE, to establish 
the payout pool. It has a higher percentage of payout tied to overall 
corporate objectives for top officers. Higher percentage of payout is 
tied to individual performance objective achievement further down 
the organization ladder. Individual performance objectives are 
weighted based on their importance. 
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The study results indicate that the payout level for lower level 
managers and supervisors, in Great Falls Gas' program are set too 
low. Payout for these participants should be raised from the 6-7.5 
percent levels to the 12-15 percent range in order to provide the 
proper performance motivation! It also appears that the CEO should 
receive payout at 25 percent of base pay or higher, for achieving 
target objectives, while other lower level positions should taper 
down to the 12-15 percent range, as minimum pay levels. 
The number of individual performance objectives for lower 
level managers and supervisors should be limited to two to four 
goals, so they can better focus on these goals. The merit pay plan 
should be continued to evaluate the routine portion of lower level 
supervisors and managers performance until more effective 
methodology is developed. 
The findings from this study are convincing to Great Falls Gas 
management that continuing to hone and expand its pay for 
performance program is in the best interest of the shareholder. But 
expansion of the program should be done carefully and a step at a 
time so that full evaluation of the program can be made as it 
progresses. Honing of its existing program is a continuous process 
because of the changing marketplace and the changing needs of its 
employees from a motivational viewpoint. 
If a utility has experienced several bad earnings years in a row 
due to weather, this should not necessarily mean the plan should be 
changed. If the plan is deemed fair by plan participants in good 
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earnings years, it may well be a sound program in poor earnings 
years too. A company should not be too hasty in plan changes before 
management has a chance to change conditions to be successful 
through goal achievement. It may take two to three years to show 
real progress in poor business climate conditions. 
Overall, Great Falls Gas Company believes it achieved its 
information goals in this study, as set out in Chapter I. 
There is need for further study on how pay for performance 
programs can be established for the remainder of the work force. 
Plus further study needs to be made to see if there are other forms 
of compensation, other that cash, which might be as effective or more 
effective in motivating employees to higher performance levels. 
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APPENDIX 1 
A COPY OF GREAT FALLS GAS COMPANY'S 
1987 PAY FOR PERFORMANCE 
MANAGEMENT INCENTIVE PLAN 
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Great Falls Gas Company & Subsidiaries 
Pay for Performance Plan 
F 1988 
A.I. ELIGIBLE PARTICIPANTS TYPE OF 
PROGRAM 
Group A 
Larry D. Geske, President & CEO ) Fixed 
Warren L. Robinson, Sr. Vice President) Variable 
&CTO 
Group B 
William J. Quast, Vice President 
& Treas./Sec. ) 
Sheila Rice, Vice President Marketing ) Variable 
Group C 
John Allen, Corp. Attorney & Asst. Sec. ) 
Lee Conwell, Dir. Human Resources ) 
Gerald Dasinger, Dir. Corp Taxes & Acct.) V a r i a b l e  
George Malin, Asst. V.P. Operations ) 
Gary Parker, Asst. V.P. Administration ) 
Earl Terwilliger, Mgr. Cust. Acct. & ) 
Admin. Services. ) 
Pay for performance proceeds will be allocated on the basis of pay 
for performance criteria established by the Board of Directors and 
Senior Management of the Company (See Schedule I). 
A II. PLAN COMMENCEMENT 
The pay for performance program of Great Falls Gas Company will be 
50% funded if the five year average on return on equity is greater 
than or equal to 12.5%. If the return on common equity is greater 
than or equal to 11.0% in the current fiscal year, the pay for 
performance plan will be funded by 50%. Either portion of the plan 
can be funded exclusive of the other portion of the plan. The rate of 
return on equity is to be based and calculated after tax. 
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The determination of the qualification of funding for the pay 
for performance plan will be determined by Arthur Young & 
Company of Denver Colorado at the end of the fiscal year. 
The earned pay for performance dollars, if any, will be paid to 
a participant on a prorated basis if the participant is employed for 
more than nine (9) months of the plan year. The plan however, does 
not create a contractual obligation with the employees of Great Falls 
Gas Company. The Plan may be continued, discontinued, and/or 
modified at the discretion of the Board of Directors. 
A. III. FUNDING LEVEL -- GROUP A 
The pay for performance plan will be based on 16% of base salaries 
as the minimum funding level and would increase by 1% of base 
salaries for each 1% increase in the fiscal year return on equity over 
the PSC allowed rate of return, up to a maximum of 26.5% of base 
salaries. If only one of the fund criteria is met (fiscal year or five 
year average), the one qualifying the funding is used to determine 
the pay for performance payout. If both criteria are met, the highest 
return is used in determining the funding level. 
A. IV. FUNDING LEVEL -- GROUP B 
The pay for performance plan will be based on 10% of base salaries 
as the minimum funding level and would increase by 1% of base 
salaries for each 1% increase in the fiscal year return on equity over 
the PSC allowed rate of return, up to a maximum of 17.5% of base 
salaries. If only one of the fund criteria is met (fiscal year or five 
year average), the one qualifying the funding is used to determine 
the pay for performance payout. If both criteria are met, the highest 
return is used in determining the funding level. 
A. V. FUNDING LEVEL - GROUP C 
The pay for performance plan will be based on 7.5% of base salaries 
as the minimum funding level and would increase by 1% of base 
salaries for each 1% increase in the fiscal year return on equity over 
the PSC allowed rate of return, up to a maximum of 12% of base 
salaries. If only one of the fund criteria is met (fiscal year or five 
57 
year average), the one qualifying the funding is used to determine 
the pay for performance payout. If both criteria are met, the highest 
return is used in determining the funding level. 
SCHEDULE I 
GREAT FALLS GAS COMPANY & SUBSIDIARIES 
PAY FOR PERFORMANCE DISTRIBUTION CRITERIA 
PAYOUT SCHEDULE 
The pay for performance funds will be approved and paid out to 
participants at the first regularly scheduled meeting of the Board of 
Directors following the annual audit of the books of the company. 
The funds will be distributed in accordance with the following 
guidelines and with the individual performance rating being 
determined by the Board of Directors and Senior Management. 
The pay for performance fund will be calculated using the base 
Compensation of the participants in the plan. Distribution of the 
funds will be based on a fixed percentage of the fund as outlined 
below. 
Incentive Factor Distribution 
Group Description Factor Weight Rate 
A President & CEO Corporate 100% 55% 
A Senior Vice- Corporate 40% 45% 
President & CFO Individual* 60% 
B Vice President Corporate 20% 50% 
Treasurer/Sec. Individual* 80% 
B Vice President Corporate 20% 50% 
Marketing Individual* 80% 
C Asst. Vice- Corporate 20% 18% 
President Admin. individual* 80% 
5 8  
C Asst. Vice- Corporate 20% 18% 
Operations Individual* 80% 
C General Office Corporate 20% 16% 
Manager Individual* 80% 
C Corporate Corporate 20% 16% 
Attorney Individual* 80% 
C Director of Corp. Corporate 20% 16% 
Taxes & Accting. Individual* 80% 
C Director of Corporate 20% 16% 
Human Resources Individual* 80% 
*Based on special objectives approved by the President, each 
year. 
(SEE  ATTACHMENT 1 FOR LISTING OF INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE 
OBJECTIVES') 
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APPENDIX 2 
A SUMMARY OF UTILITY 
SURVEY RESULTS 
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Results of Great Falls Gas Company's Survey of Other Utilities Pay For Performance Programs 
5/16/88 
Q1. A.) Does your company have a pay for performance program 
Responses From 17 surveys sent out: 
11 yes. 2 No 4 No response 
Q1.B.) Please describe the general structure of your pay for performance plan 
Threshold Qualification for plan payout 
Co. 1 5 year rolling Average ROE-50% 
Current Year ROE -50% 
(ROE threshold set @1.25% below 
PSC allowed ROE)=88%of allowed ROE 
Specific Performance for Actual Payout Level of Payout- % Pay 
President 100% Based on threshold criteria 
Each additional 1% ROE over threshold 
18% of actual sal. paid 
1% additional bonus 
Sr. V.P. 40% Based on threshold-60% spec. pert. obj. 
Each additional 1% ROE 
15% of actual sal. paid 
same as president 
V.P. 20% Based on threshold -80% spec. perf. obj. 
Each additional 1% ROE over threshold 
10% of actual sal. paid 
1% additional bonus 
CD 
Current Year ROE -25% 
Specific Performance Object-75% 
mgrs & Same as V. P. 
Key Staff Same as V. P. 
Supvrs 25% Based on threshold ROE 
75% Based on Spec. Perf. Objectives 
Q1.B.) Please describe the general structure of your pay for performance plan (Continued) 
Threshold Qualification for plan payout Specific Performance for Actual Payout 
Co. 2 Must Achieve min. of 80% of ROE 
Stated in Approved Profit Plan 
80 % = 50% Payout 
85 % - 62.5% Payout 
90 % - 75% Payout 
100 % - 100% Payout 
105 % - 112.5% Payout 
110 % - 120% Payout Maximum 
Payout based with weighting of: 
Current Year ROE =70% 
Ranking of Their Retail Rate 








Sr. Mgrs-Lrg Areas 
Grd 13 Dept Hds. 
Grd 12 Mgrs-Dir 
Grd 11 Mgrs.-Sen Stff(sml dept) 
7.5% of actual sal. paid 
1% additional bonus 
1.50% 
4.50% 
Level of Payout- % Pay 




35" "  
32.5" "  
30" "  
25" "  
2 0 "  "  
15" " 
12.5 " " 
Co. 3 Must Achieve min. of PSC allowed ROE 20 Controllable Expense ltems-50% 
Return on Total Assets(PSC Allow)=50% 
Group Scale of payout If Controllable Exp is a< 
Bonus 100% Budgeted Exp. =0% Payout 
inclds 95% Budgeted Exp. >1.0% 
Officers* 90% Budgeted Exp. >2.0% 
Dept Heads- 85% Budgeted Exp. >2.5% 
Supvrs. 80% Budgeted Exp. >3.0% 
Scale of Payout if Return on Total Asset 
PSC Allowed Return on Assets -0% 
1 % Over PSC Allowed >1.0% 
1.5% Over PSC Allowed -1.5% 
2.0% Over PSC Allowed >2.0% 
2.5% Over PSC Allowed =2.5% 
3.0% Over PSC Allowed =3.0% 
Q1.B.) Please describe the general structure of your pay for performance plan (Continued) 
Threshold Qualification for plan payout Specific Performance for Actual Payout 
Co. 4 Threshold -must earn PSC allowROE 8 Employees Elgible-8 officers, mgrs,key staff 
CEO and two Board Members(one inside-one ou 
determine who gets how much, determination is 
strictly subjective based on how they saw each 
participant's performance in prior year. 
Co. 5 Compensation at risk is two pronged-
1. Long Term Incentive earned over 3 years, 
stock options-tied to corporate ROE peer group 
ranking-higher then 25 percentile 50% payout, 
above 50th percentile-100% payout 
above 75th quartile(150% Payout) 
Stock options awarded to individuals as they 
deem performance warrants 
2. Annual Cash Bonus tied to meeting specific 
performance objectives for each particiapant which enhance the 
Company's bottom line performance-
top 10 salary grades elgible down to Asst. VP Line Positions-cash bonus 
Job Grade titles elgibl Thres. Target Max (% 
-1- COB/Pres/C 15 35 70 
2-4 V. Chrm/Pr 15 35 60 
5-6 EX. Vp/Sr.V 15 30 55 
7-8 Sr VP/VP 12 25 45 
9-10 Mp 10 20 35 
Q1.B.) Please describe the general structure of your pay for performance plan (Continued) 
Threshold for plan payout qualification 
Company No.6 Current year Utility Rate of Return Compared 
to Profit Plan ROE 
Two criteria 
1)Return on Equity less inflation rate-60% 
2)Ranking with peer group companies of 
ratio of customers/employees-40% weighting 
Specific Performance for Actual Payout Level of Payout- % Pay 
Min Payout Level-67% if Profit Plan ROE 
less inflation rate is met 
Target Payout Level-100% if Profit Plan met 
Max. Payout-150% 
% payout by job title not obtained 
Company No. 7 Weighted on 3 factors 
15% on Meeting ROE of Parent Co 
45% on " " " DistbrCo. 
40% on Meeting individual specific perf. object 
Individual achievement of 
specific performance object 
ives is based on individual 
performance rating 





Guideline Bonus Amounts % Base 
Division Heads 
Executive Levels 17 and Above 
Management Levels 14-16 and PAT 8 
Management Levels 9-13 
Min Target Max 
alary 50% 100% 150% 
12% The above % apply to Parent 
10 and Distbr. Co. goal achievem' 
6 Min. set at budget levels 
4 
Company No.8 Threshold based on ranking of company with 
10 peer group companies-each year Board of 
Directors decides min. ranking to qualify for 
incentive program-This year Company must 
rank 4th highest of peer group in order for 
program to trigger to min. levels 
last year were at bottom of peer group co.s 
no pay out 




Company can be losing money and individual 
can still receive some payout 
Payout is based on: 
Peer Group Ranking-50% 
Individual Goal achievement-50% 
Individual Goal Achievement 
Min Rating-25% payout 
up to 
Max. Exceptional performance-150% payout 
Individual may meet his goals even if Dept 
did not meet its goals-President decides if each person 
did or not achieve their goals as final say 
Program applies to Sr. V.P.'s and above % Payout of base pay not available 
Q1.B.) Please describe the general structure of your pay for performance plan (Continued) 
Threshold for plan payout qualification 
Company No.9 Must achieve ROE threshold set level 
weighting of award- 60% ROE 
-40% on controllable O & M 
Specific Performance for Actual Payout 
There are 60 people in program 
awards based on individual achievement of 
Pool dollars determined for ROE and Control O&M By: 
Min payout-85% of target 
Target- 100% 
Max- 110% 
Payout target awards 
CEO-25% 
Excutives Direct Reporting to Pres-20% 
Officers reporting to Exec.s-15% 
Mid Managers-10% 
Company No10 3 year roiling ROE set at PSC allow ROE 
23 executives elgibie for program- participants 
selected by president 
pool is 10% of aggregate salaries 
Maximum award is 25 % of base pay 
awards are made based on achievement of 
individual goal achievement 
only information available 
Company No 11 Bonus program is tied to major corporations 
management incentive program 
50% weighting to consolidated corp.'s ROE 
50% " " Individual performance 
payout to individual 
ROE-3% of payroll 
Individual performance-3% max. 
Parent company has been very depressed 
in earnings for many years, not much payout 
APPENDIX 2 
Results of Utility Survey 
5 / 1 6 / 8 8  
Professional Paper 
L. D. Geske 
Q. 2. Why did your Company establish your pay for 
performance program? 
Summary of responses: Wanted to establish a pay system 
which: 
a. Directed individual effort of officers and managers to key 
results areas of the Company to improve bottom line results. 
b. Wanted a program to build a team effort to improve 
performance 
c. Wanted a program to help change direction of the 
organization with a constantly changing business. 
Q.3. How long have you had your pay for performance 
program? 
Number of Responses 
1 year- 2 
2-5 years- 3 
6-10 years- 4 
over 10 years- 1 
no response 1 
median Length of Time Since Inception= 5 years 
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Q.5. Could you please provide at least four (4) examples of 
individual or group performance objectives? 
Response: Several examples were sent in and they are included 
in the Appendix of this report. 
Q.6. How frequent are performance objectives reviewed for 
change? 
Quarterly semiannual annually 
•Four responses: If a change in department or corporate 
strategy changes during the year, specific performance objectives are 
changed at that time. 
Q.7. A.) How do you measure whether an individual has 
achieved all or a portion of his or her objectives? 
Responses: An employee may receive partial credit for an 
1 10* 
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objective it the supervisor so chooses. Objectives are hard and fast 
and it is relatively simple to determine if objectives have been 
achieved. 
B.) Do you weight each objective? 
Responses: Weighted Not Weighted 
5 6 
Q.8. Who is included in your pay for performance program? 
Responses: See Q.l. Responses too. 
Senior Officers Only All Officers Officers.Managers Off..Mgrs.Supvrs 
2 1 4 4 
Q.9. Why have you limited your program to only these 
individuals listed above 
Responses: 
Have expanded program Other Responses: 
which used to only include Has included same individuals 
top officers. for over 10 years since 
incept. 
8* Will expand to supvr. level next 
year. 
•Three responses: Plan on expanding pay for performance to 
entire work-force in near future. 
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Q.10. How do you tie pay for performance objective 
achievement into compensation? Response included in 
responses to Q.l. 
Q.ll. Has your program accomplished your overall 
corporate objectives for establishing the program? 
Responses: 
Company No. 1-It has accomplished most of our objectives. I 
believe we may need to raise the level of potential pay out for 
supervisors and managers to make the incentive more motivating to 
participants. We want to expand the program to all employees 
within 3 years. Officers and Managers take the same risks as 
shareholders; i.e. regulatory, weather, and the economy. Supervisors 
only take 25% of shareholder risk the other 75% is tied to their 
specific performance objectives which are paid if achieved, whether 
the Company earns its return or not. 
Company No. 2- The 30% weighting tied to comparing our rates 
with other utilities in the region is a comparison which is difficult to 
make and plan participants feel it is out of their control. We are 
looking for other criteria which may be more meaningful to the 
company and participants. 
Plan are designed so that participants take the same risks as 
shareholders, such as, regulatory, weather, and the economy. They 
believe this is the way it should be; i.e. if the shareholder benefits, 
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shareholders, such as, regulatory, weather, and the economy. They 
believe this is the way it should be; i.e. if the shareholder benefits, 
then they should too, and vice versa. 
Company No.3- Our Company is a small part of the total 
consolidated corporation. The return on assets 50% weighting we 
feel is out of our hands since corporate adds and deletes to capital 
additions. We feel we do not have control of this portion of the 
program. Plan participants take the same risks as the shareholder. 
If the shareholder benefits plan participants benefit if 20 
controllable expense item criteria is met total payout occurs. 
Company No. 4- The granting of the bonus awards is strictly up 
to the compensation committee of the Board and I'll admit is very 
subjective. I'm looking for a more formal plan and will look forward 
to receiving a copy of your study. 
Company No. 5- Yes, the proof of the pudding is that our ROE is 
at the top of our peer group companies. In the cash bonus program, 
we need to set more specific performance criteria for each 
participant for more accurate determination of goal achievement. 
Company No. 6.- plan has been in place only one year. There 
were several bugs in the plan on implementation which are now 
being worked out. It has for manager level on up. Also the CEO has 
discretion to change to a particular employee based on how the CEO 
values each individual's performance. This discretion can equate to 
up to 25% increase or decrease in individual's performance. 
Company No. 7.- The results at the supervisory level have been 
disappointing in that we don't feel they relate to overall corporate 
goals very well and therefore have not seen measurable 
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improvements in their performance. 
Company No.9.- Program has increased focusing in on corporate 
goals and has improved individual participant's performance. Our 
industry segment is going through tremendous change and we're still 
struggling. People now know that they have to produce or there's no 
big payoff. 
Company No. 10.- Prior to this time the Board made the decision 
as to how incentive awards were made. Now corporate goals are met 
and personal objectives must be achieved too, for payout. 
Company No. 11.-No. Incentive levels too low. 
Q.12. What are the true strengths of your program? 
Summary of Responses: Corporate objectives are met and 
employees have bought into the program. We are more successful. 
We are working more as a team. One of the performance objectives 
is that ROE must rank well among our peer group companies; since 
our earnings are the highest of the group I would say we are 
successful. 
Goals are set annually top to bottom, more cohesive organization; 
more challenges to all members of management. 
Our program has only been in place for a year so its difficult to 
say whether its successful yet. 
Reward managers for jobs well done. 
Shoves decision responsibility down the organization for more 
effective decision making. We have also implemented zero based 
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budgeting in our organization which has kept us out of filing for rate 
increases since 1982. Our work force has decreased from 2500 
employees to 1650 but are still adding 10-15 thousand new 
customers per year. Our whole management team is geared to the 
thinking that there is always a better way to get the job done, thanks 
to pay for performance. 
Focuses in on Corporate and individual goals and performance. 
Tightens the tie of individual performance to corporate 
objectives. 
Q.13. What are the weaknesses of your program? 
Responses: 
Co. 1- see responses in Q.ll 
2- Much upward pressure was experienced to upgrade 
grade 10 employees into the program since it starts at grade 11. 
Now the Chairman of the Board must approve all grade changes for 
10 to 11, which has solved the problem. 
Co. 3-see responses in Q.ll 
Co. 4-" " " " 
Co. 5-" " " " 
Co. 6- Concerned of the cost of the program which equates to a 
max of 1 % of earnings. Plus the way our pension benefits program 
is written it may run pension costs up too fast. 
Co. 7- Incentive program at the supervisory level is not 
effective; they do not seem to have a grasp of overall corporate goals 
and the meaning of return to shareholder. Also, need better quality 
goals for all; we now have 4-7 for each participant, I believe 2-3 for 
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first line supervisors might focus their attention better. 
Co. 8- Very difficult to get agreement on fairness of goals and 
payoff between our 6 different companies, there is a lot of bickering 
about how unfair some goals are compared to their tough goals. 
Many don't fully understand the program which causes more friction. 
I believe our program is too complicated and needs to be simplified 
and better communicated as to how it works. 
Co. 9- Communications difficult. Lower level managers think it 
is an entitlements program; doesn't seem to be a strong enough tie of 
pay to performance. We are setting up focus groups to get feedback 
as to what the strengths and weaknesses are from participants so 
program can be improved. Some feedback indicates that they do not 
fully understand how the program works, so we may need to do a 
better job of explaining the program to participants. 
Co. 10- Plan only two years old, some worried about the cost of 
the program. 
Co. 11- No response to this question. 
Q.14. If you were just setting up your program today what 
would you do differently? 
Responses: Answers the same as Q.ll outlining weaknesses. 
Q.15. On a scale of 1 to 10 where would your rank your 
pay for performance program( with 10 being the highest 
and best rating)? 
Responses: 
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Co. No. 1-7 rating 
" " 2- 8 " 
" " 3- 5 " 
" " 4-No rating given 
" " 5-No rating given 
Co. No. 6- on enthusiasm an 8 or 9 rating, on other areas the 
program is too new to rate (1 yr). 
Co. No. 7- I would rate our program an 8 w/o first line 
supervisors and only a 5 rating with them in the program. 
Co. No. 8-A 5 rating. 
Co. No. 9-Rating on the design of program=8-9 
Rating on the administration of plan=5-6 
Co. No. 10 & 11- No rating given 
Q.16. Has your Company developed its own Pay for 
Performance program or what was the source of its 
originat ion? 
Responses: 
Developed own program Used Consultants Used Both 
5 2 4* 
* Three responses: Used consultants initially to set up program 
and have been trying to streamline it in house. 
Q.17. Did you use the aid of an outside consultant to 
establish your program? If so who was the consultant? 
Response to first part of this question is shown in Q.16. 
Consultants Used: Booz-Allen ( Lou Brandieze) 
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Hewlett Corp. 
Jim Teevan-private consultant(Seattle) 
Q.18. Do you have a measurement system, which 
determines how cost effective your program is, such as, 
comparing the payroll cost of your program with bottom 
line improvement? 
Responses: 
Not at this time Yes 
7* 4** 
*Co. No. 1- We have set up an auditing task group to develop 
the criteria for determining the success of the pay for performance 
program. 
** Co.s No. 5 & 8- We feel the comparison with our peer group 
ROE is a good indication of how effective the program is; i. e. 
compensation dollars spent on at risk incentive pay, returns to 
shareholder many times over. 
Co. No. 7-Have a group of senior managers who review goals 
of each participant from goal reports to check progress of goal 
achievement. 
Co. No. 9- Board must approve targets, plus we review how 
we did as a whole group. 
Q.19. Have you sold the concept of pay for performance to 
your Public Utility Commission for rate making purposes? 
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Responses: 
Company No. 1- The PSC allowed half of our bonus in the cost 
of service which was tied to the rolling 5 yr. average of ROE, but 
denied the other half tied only to the current year's ROE. In our most 
recent case they allowed all of the pay for performance incentive pay 
but warned us that next rate case we would have to fully justify all 
of it as to how it benefitted the rate payers. That is why we have set 
up an auditing task force to develop the audit criteria. 
Co. No. 2. PSC is aware of the program but are just testing the 
concept. 
Co. No. 3. Program is new and untested with PSC. 
Co. No. 4. No response to this question. 
Co. No. 5. FERC has no problem with program- one state 
Commission is currently having problems with understanding our 
long term stock option program. 
Co. No. 6. Our's is a new program and has not been presented to 
PSC's. 
Co. No. 7. Had no problem selling program to PSC because it 
enhances our overall effectiveness and its the best bang for the buck. 
Co. No.8. Have had no problem with regulatory approvals. 
Co. No.9. Program was reviewed in 1984 by PSC, we had the 
consultant testify to the merits of the program; since then no 
problems from regulators. 
Co.'s No. 10 & 11. No response to this question. 
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APPENDIX 3 
A LISTING OF GAS UTILITIES PARTICIPATING IN 
THE GAS UTILITY SURVEY 
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APPENDIX 3 
Listing of Gas Utility Companies 
Who Responded To This Survey 
1. ARKLA 
2. Carnigie Natural Gas Company 
3. Citizens Gas Company 
4. Consumers Power Company 
5. Gas Company of New Mexico 
6. Great Falls Gas Company 
7. Kansas Public Service Company 
8. Michigan Gas Utility 
9. Michigan Gas Utility 
10. Southwest Gas Corporation 
11. TRANSCO 
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APPENDIX 4 
SOLICITATION COVER LETTER AND 
UTILITY SURVEY FORM 
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Great Falls Gas Company has had an executive and managerial Pay for 
Performance Program since 1982, two years ago we extended it to include first 
line supervisory personnel. We are continually looking for information to 
make our program more effective. This survey is an attempt to accomplish this 
objective. 
We are surveying two dozen gas utility companies who have Pay for Performance 
programs, so that we might adopt the most effective methods and techniques 
found by other's experience. 
We will consolidate our survey findings into a report which we would be happy 
to share with participants of this study. All corporate names will be kept 
confidential and the information will be consolidated and tabularized as much 
as possible. We will list the companies who have participated in the study. 
We are thanking you in advance for your participation and look forward to 
receiving your response and reviewing your program. If you have questions 
about the survey, please call me (406 761-7100). 
We would appreciate the return of the completed survey form by May 6, 1988. A 
pre-paid envelope is enclosed for your convenience. A copy of the finished 
report will be sent to you by mid June 1988. 
Sincerely, 
Larry D. Geske 
President and CEO 
/caj 
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Suruey Form 
Pay For Performance 
Pay for performance is defined as a compensation program 
which sets individual performance objectives for indiuidual 
supervisors, managers and officers of the company and are paid 
additional compensation for achieving those objectives. If you 
need additional space please attach additional sheets and refer 
to survey question number. 
I. Does your company have a pay for performance program? If 
so would you please describe or include a copy of program 
description? 
2. UJhy did your Company establish your pay for performance 
program? 
3. Horn long have you had your pay for performance program? 
4. Do you set individual or group performance objectives? If 
group how have you set up your groups (who is included)? 
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5. UJhat is the basic corporate criteria used in setting indiuidual 
or group performance objectiues? Could you please prouide at 
least four (4) representatiue examples for corporate 
objectiues( such as return on equity, customers / employee) and 
four for specific indiuidual or group performance objectiues 
(performance objectiues set specifically for their job or group 
achieuement)? 
6. How frequent are performance objectiues reuiewed with the 
indiuidual by superior(s)? 
7. How do you measure whether an indiuidual has achieued all 
or a portion of his or her objectiues (do you weight each 
objectiue)? Could you please prouide eiiamples? 
8 1  
8. Who is included in your pay for performance program? Would 
you please list them by job title and include the % of their base 
pay which is at risk (amount tied to specific performance 
objectiues)? 
Indiuiduals included, by job title % Base Pay Tied To Perf. 
Objectiues 
9. Why haue you limited your program to only these indiuiduals 
listed aboue? 
10. How do you tie pay for performance objectiue achieuement 
into compensation (i.e. is part of the at risk compensation tied 
to ouerall corporate performance, such as return on equity and 
part to specific indiuidual performance objectiues)? Please 
state the % of compensation tied to ouerall corporate objectiues 
uersus % tied to indiuidual performance objectiues for each 
indiuidual or group. 
8 2  
11. Has your program accomplished your ouerall corporate 
objectiues for establishing the program? Please elaborate as to 
why you think it has or has not accomplished corporate 
objectiues? 
12. What are the true strengths of your program? 
13. UJhat are the weaknesses of your program? Briefly state 
why they are weaknesses. 
14. If you were just setting up your program today what would 
you do differently? 
15. On the scale shown where would you rank your Company's 
Pay For Performance Program for effectiueness? (please circle 
your choice) 
Worst 1 23456789 10 Best 
8 3  
16. Has your Company deueloped its ouin Pay For Performance 
program or UJhat was the source of its origination? 
17. Did you use the aid of an outside consultant to establish 
your program? If so who was the consultant? 
18. Do you haue a measurement system, which determines how 
cost effectiue your program is, such as, comparing the payroll 
cost of your program with bottom line improuement? 
19. Haue you sold the concept of pay for performance to your 
Public Utility Commission for rate making purposes? 
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APPENDIX 5 
EXAMPLES OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 




F L B B T  6  F A C I L I T I E S  
1 9 8 8  G O A L S  
» ! O A L  S T R A T E G Y  
D o v o l o p  a  l o n g - t e r m  f a c i l i t i e s  
p l a n  f o r  t h a  M e t r o  f a c i l i t i e s  
w h i c h  r e s p o n d s  t o  c o r p o r a t e  
n a e d s  a n d  c o m m u n i t y  d e v e l o p ­
m e n t  p r e s s u r e s .  
W l t l G l l T U l )  0  4 0 \  
1 . A .  E v a l u a t e  a l l  a v a i l a b l e  c u s t o m e r s ,  
e m p l o y e e s ,  a n d  s y s t e m  d e s i g n  
I n f o r m a t i o n  t o  d e t e r m i n e  f u t u r e  
n e e d s  f o r  f a c i l i t y  l o c a t i o n s .  
1 . 5 .  A n a y l z e  s p a c e  a n d  u s o  r e q u i r e ­
m e n t s  b y  D i v i s i o n / D e p a r t m e n t s  
t o  d o v o l o p  b u i l d i n g  a n d  s l t o  
n e e d s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  b a s e  c o s t s .  
53 
l . C  I d e n t i f y  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  e x i s t i n g  
f a c i l i t i e s  a n d  s i t e s  a l o n g  w i t h  
p r o j e c t e d  f i n a n c i a l  I m p a c t  t o  
1  D  I n c o r p o r a t e  a l l  a n a l y s i s  I n t o  a  
c o m p r e h e n s i v e  p l a n  w h i c h  w i l l  
b a  r e s p o n s i v e  t o  
f u t u r e  n o e d s  
E v a l u a t e  A s s i g n o r )  C a r  P o l i c y  
e l i g i b i l i t y  a n t )  f i n a n c i a l  
I m p a c t  l o  
W E I G H T E O  0  1 5 *  
2 . A  E v a l u a t o  c u r r e n t  ( l e o t  p r a c t i c e s  
a n d  f l e e t  I n f o r m a t i o n  o n  e l i g i b i l i t y  
c r i t e r i a  a n d  c o s t  t o  a m p l o y e o s  o f  
a  c o m p a n y  f u r n i s h e d  c a r .  
2  3  E v a l u a t e  c u r r e n t  f i n a n c i a l  I m p a c t  
o f  p o l i c y  a n d  
e m p l o y e e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  
2 - C  R o c o m m e n d  c h a n g e s  s u p p o r t e d  b y  
a n a l y s i s  a n d  p u b l i s h  t o  a l l  
a f f e c t e d  m a n a g e m e n t  p e r s o n n e l .  
METHOD OP MEASUREMENT 
1  A .  1 ,  
1.8,1. 
1.C.l. 
1  D . l .  
J . A . I .  
2 . B . I .  
2 . C . I .  
D e t a i l e d  r e p o r t  d o v o t o p e d  
b y  5 / 1 / 8 1 1 .  
B u i l d i n g  a n d  s l t o  n o o i l s  
e s t a b l i s h e d  a n d  d o c u m e n t e d  
b y  0 / 1 / 1 1 ( 1 .  
A l t e r n a t i v e s  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  
I m p a c t s  d e v o l o p o d  b y  
lO/l/Ol). 
C o m p r o h o n s l v o  P l a n  
d e v e l o p e d  a n d  a p p r o v e d  
b y  1 2 / 3 1 / 0 0  e n d  
i m p l e m e n t e d  c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  m i l e s t o n e s  
P o l l  c o m p l e t e d  b y  3 / 3 1  / 0 U  
a n d  d o c u m e n t e d  
D e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s  
c o m p l e t e d  b y  4 / 3 0 / 0 0  
a n d  r e p o r t  d o c u m e n t e d .  
C h a n g e s  r e c o m m e n d e d  
a n d  a p p r o v e d  b y  6 / 1 / 0 0  
a n d  I m p l e m e n t e d  p e r  
m i l e s t o n e s  I d e n t i f i e d  
I n  f i n a l  r e p o r t .  
P L E B T  6  F A C I L I T I E S  
1 9 8 8  G O A L S  
C O A L  S T R A T E G Y  
M a n a g e  o p e r a t i n g  e x p e n s e s  n o t  
t o  e x c e e d  $ 5 , 4 0 7 , 5 0 0  f o r  1 9 8 8  
B u d g e t .  
WEIGHTED 8 15* 
3 . A ,  A n a l y z e  a n d  e v a l u a t e  o p e r a t i o n a l  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  f o r  s e r v i c e s  p r o v i d e d  
a n d  I m p l e m e n t  p l a n s  t o  a c h i e v e  
5 0 , 0 0 0  i n  s a v i n g s  t h r o u g h  m o r e  
e f f i c i e n t  u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  a v a i l a b l e  
r e s o u r c e s .  
3 . B .  R e v i e w  a l l  d e p a r t m e n t a l  s p e n d i n g  
p l a n s  f o r  1 9 8 8  a n d  r e d u c e  e x p e n d i ­
t u r e s  b y  $ 5 0 , 0 0 0  w h i l e  m a i n t a i n i n g  
q u a l i t y  s e r v i c e s  t o  
3 , C .  E v a l u a t e  d e p a r t m e n t a l  o p e r a t i n g  
p r o g r a m s  a n d  a s s u r e  a  f l e x i b l e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  w h e r e  f u n c t i o n s  a r e  
c o s t  e f f e c t i v e ,  w i t h  p r o g r a m s  a n d  
p r o c e d u r e s  e f f e c t i v e l y  s u p p o r t i n g  
C o m p a n y ,  d i v i s i o n a l ,  a n d  d e p a r t ­
m e n t a l  g o a l s  u s i n g  a  z e r o - b a s o d  
m a n a g e m e n t  a p p r o a c h .  
3  0 .  D o v o l o p  k e y  o p e r a t i n g  I n d i c a t o r s  
I  o r  F l o a t  6  F a c i l i t i e s  w h i c h  c a n  
b e  u s e d  t o  m e a s u r e  a n d  I m p r o v e  
p e r f o r m a n c e .  
M E T H O D  O F  M E A S U R E M E N T  
3 . A . I .  
3 . B . I .  
3 . C . I .  
3  O  1  
3  0  2  
P l a n s  d e v e l o p e d  b y  
4 / 1 5 / 8 8  a n d  l m p l e m e n t o d  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  m i l e s t o n e s .  
D o c u m e n t  e x p e n s e  
r u d u c t l o n s  b y  3 / 1 5 / 8 0  
a n d  I m p l e m e n t .  
P l a n s  d e v e l o p e d  b y  
3 / 1 5 / 8 0  a n d  i m p l e m e n t e d  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  e s t a b l i s h o d  
m i l e s t o n e s .  
M e a s u r e s  I d e n t i f i e d  b y  2/2B/0Q. 
T r a c k i n g  s y s t e m  
l m p l e m e n t o d  b y  3 / 3 1 / Q G  
w i t h  r e p o r t i n g  t o  
d i v i s i o n a l  V P  o n  a  
s o m l - a n n u a )  b a s i s  
FLEET 6 FACILITIES 
1908 COALS 
^OAL STRATEGY METHOD OP MEASUREMENT 
D e v e l o p  a  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  e o r p -
o r a t o  s e c u r i t y  p l a n  t o  p r o t e c t  
p r o p e r t y  a n d  e n s u r e  
e m p l o y e o  s a f e t y .  
W H I G l I T L i O  0  1 0 \  
i  D o v o l o p  a t  l o a s t  2  e n h a n c o d  
s e r v i c e s  t o  c u s t o m e r s  I n  
o t h e r  d i v i s i o n s  
o r  c o m p a n l o s  
WEIGHTED 0  10 \  
f i  M a r k e t  e x c e s s  p r o p o r ' . l e s  t o  
e f f e c t i v e l y  s u p p o r t  
f i n a n c i a l  g o a l s  
4 . A ,  A n a l y z e  a n d  e v a l u a t e  a l l  
c u r r e n t  s e c u r i t y  p r o b l e m s  a n d  
r e c o m m e n d  s o l u t i o n s  t o  e n h a n c e  
s i t e  a n d  b u i l d i n g  I n t e g r i t y .  
4  D  I n c o r p o r a t e  o i l  f i n d i n g s  a n d  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  I n t o  a  c o m p r e ­
h e n s i v e  p l a n  f o r  e n s u r i n g  s a f e t y  
a n d  s e c u r i t y  a t  a l l  p r o p e r t y  s l t o s .  
4  C  C l e a r l y  c o m m u n i c a t e  t o  a l l  e m p l o y e e s  
c o r p o r a t e  s e c u r i t y  e x p e c t a t i o n s  f o r  
a l l  b u i l d i n g s  a n d  p r o p e r t y  s i t e s  
5 . A .  E v a l u a t e  s e r v i c e s  p r o v i d e d  t o  
o t h e r  d i v i s i o n s  a n d  D E I  c o m p ­
a n i e s  a n d  d e v e l o p  p l a n s  f o r  
p r o v i d i n g  s e r v i c e s  a t  a  m o r a  
c o s t  e f f i c i e n t  r a t o  o r  I n c r o a s o d  
q u a l i t y  a t  t h o  s a m e  r a t e  
6 . A  E v a l u a t e  a l l  e x c e s s  p r o p e r t i e s  
a n d  d e v o l n p  a  s t r a t e g i c  m a r ­
k e t i n g  p l a n  w h i c h  e s t a b l i s h e s  
c r i t e r i a  f o r  s a l e  o f  p r o p e r t i e s  
WI2ICI ITED 0  10*  
4 . A . I .  D e t a i l e d  r e p o r t  d e v e l o p e d  
b y  7 / 1 / 0 8 .  
4  n . l .  P l a n  d o v o l o p o d  n n r l  '  
a p p r o v e d  b y  9 / 1 / U O  n m l  
l m p l e m e n t o d  c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  m i l e s t o n e s .  
4  C  1  S o c u r l t y  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  t o  a l l  
e m p l o y e e s  b y  1 2 / 3 1 / 0 0  
5 . A  1  S e r v i c e s  I d e n t i f i e r )  n n d  
p l a n  d e v e l o p e d  b y  
3 / 3 0 / 0 0  
5 , A  2  P l a n s  I m p l e m e n t e d  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  m i l e s t o n e s  
a n d  m o a s u r e s  o f  
p e r f o r m a n c e  
6  A  1  P l a n s  d o v o l o p o d  f o r  n i l  
m a j o r  p r o p o r t l o s  b y  
3 / 1 5 / 0 0  a n d  l m p l o m e n t o d  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  p l a n  
m i l e s t o n e s  
nTOwrca; FESOJTCS 
1988 GDUS 
JANlARJf 20, 1983 
GOAL 
linage operating censes 
consistent with Division and 
Canpany Goals. (251) 
l.A. 
STRAEXg 
Departmental operating expenses 
will rot exceed: $284,883. 
l.B. Utilizing zero-based management, 
evaluate service programs and 
interhal departniental procedures, 
including automated systems, to 
identify approaches for 
effectively supporting Canpany 
and divisional goals. 
l.C. Identify operating indicators 
which measure and improve 
performance. 
Enhance services to other divisions 
in ard other 
companies. (20%) 
2.A. Develop and implement at least 
one enhanced service to customers 
in other divisions. 
2.B. Identify and implement at least 
one enhanced service for other 
cenpanies. 
j-ETEDO CP j-CASURB-an' 
l.A.l. Financial reports. 
l.B.l. Plan developed and 
opportunities identified by 
the end of first quartet 1903 
and implefnented consistent with 
established milestones. 
l.C.l. Measures identified by 3/1/88. 
l.C. 2. Tracking system implejnented by 
4/1/88, with report to Div. 
V.P. at least every six nonths. 
2.A.I. Servioe developed by 3/30/88. 
2.A,2. Develop and iroplerrent tracking 
system bf 4/30/88 with reports 




Service identified ard 
developed by 4/1/88. 





3. Increase variety of media available 3 .A. 
through Information Resources to 
more adequately meet employee 
information needs ar<3 appropriate 
to modern technologies ard 
lifestyles. (20%) 
STPA1SGY 
Select, acquire, organize and 
promote a core collection of 
audio cassettes cn topics 
relevant to current ocrrpany 
interests. Provide equipment ard 
expertise to support the service. 
MZTECO CP hCASUREMgTr 
3.A.I. Plan of approach submitted and 
approved by 7/31/88. 
3.A.2. Collection in place ard list of 
new titles distributed by 
11/30/88. 
3.A.3. Staff trained in use of 
equipment 6/30/88. 
3.3. Identify sources ard develop and 3.8.1. Service in place by 10/31/00 
Itt* prcrote clearinghouse service for 
borrowing ard renting videotapes 
and f i Lts. 
3-C. Analyze A-V equipment needs 3 C.l. Plan developed by <1/30/00 
Prepare 3 year plan to update 
necessary support equipment. 3.C.2. Implement consistent with plan 
as part of budget process. 
3.D. Cevelcp a plan of approach to 
improve services which support 
rapidly Increasing information 
needs of enployees using PC 
systems. 
3.D.I. Approach determined arri 
approved by 11/30/88, and 





Improve access to and delivery 
information without increasing 
storage space or staff 
requirements. (20%) 
Establish a planned approach to 
acquisition of new information 
resources to provide adequate 
support for current and future 
company projects. (15%) 
STRMBGy j-CTTOO CP l-EASPRG-EOT 
Evaluate at least 3 new online 
retrieval systems for their 
applicability to carpany needs. 
4.A.1, Recommendations by 5/31/08 fo 
1989 budget planning. 
Evaluate usefulness of software 
systems which facilitate 
downloading and editing online 
data, and of "gateway" systems 
which facilitate use of current 
online systems. Recccrr.end 
appropriate systems and develop 
schedule for phased 
implementation or future 
evaluation. 
4.B.I. Recoamendaticos by 8/31/80. 
Implemented consistent with 
established milestones. 
Evaluate potential use of 
microformats for storage of 
infrequently referenced 
materials. Aralyze oosts and 
benefits of the format and 
necessary supporting equipment. 
4.C.l. Recommendation submitted by 
10/31/88. 
Develop criteria for analyzing 
and prioritizing potential 
resources to be purchased for 
print and A-V collections, 
5.A.I. Criteria developed by 9/30/80 






5. Continued. 5.3. Identify data roqji rerants to 
adequately analyze collection 
usage ard areas needirg 
development. Establish 
milestones to design arri 
i.Tpleront the system. 
CO 
mrtou cF (-cAScmg^r 
5.B.I. Approach developed b/ 12/15/00 
and implemented as scheduled. 
Incentive Goals for Corporate Attorney 
Fiscal 1988 
Company wide return on equity target 
Legal Collections: 30% weight 
Regulatory: 40% weight 
Corporate: 10% weight 
20% weight 
25% earned if 60% collected 
50% earned if 75% collected 
100% earned if 80% collected with 
interpolation of actual final # 
10% achieve new classifications as 
proposed 
10% accomplishment recovery of 
balancing account dollars 
10% obtain increased revenues in final 
order over interim level - 1/2 
achieved if additional revenues 
exceed $25,000, 100% earned if 
additional revenues exceed $50,000 
10% achieve reduction in City Gate of 
6%, 9%, 12% to acquire 50%, 75% 
and 100% of this 10% 
3% perform analysis of total 
expenditures for legal services by 
all company departments and 
propose plan to reduce those 
expenditures by 20% annually 
3% keep expenditures for Legal 
Department 10% below budget 
4% assist in load building by either 
providing marketing department 
with five leads or two additional 
appliance conversions; and by 
accomplishing regulatory approval 
for outdoor gas lighting 
Signature - Supervisor Signature - Participant 
Date 
ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT AND OPERATING SUPERINTENDENT 
FISCAL -1988 MANAGER BONUS GOALS 
GOALS TO BE COMPLETED BY DUE DATES LISTED OR BY JUNE 30, 1988 
TO QUALIFY 80% AVAILABLE BONUS UNDER THE MANAGEMENT BONUS 
PROGRAM. 
25% 1. Implementation of Random Sampling Meter Program to re­
place present 10 year Periodic Test Program. 
25% if implemented by November 1, 1987 
15% if implemented by January 1, 1988 
10% if implemented by March 31, 1988 
20% 2. Reduce Distribution Department Operations and Maintenance 
expenses through productivity improvements and man­
power planning. 
100% - 5% decrease in expenses from Fiscal 1988 
budget level 
50% - 3% decrease in expenses from Fiscal 1988 
budget level 
25% - 1% decrease in expenses from Fiscal 1988 
budget level 
10% - .5% decrease in expenses from Fiscal 1980 
budget level 
15% 3. Reduce fleet gasoline usage by increased C.N.G. usage 
15% if a 50% reduction in gallons of gasoline is 
realized 
10% if a 30% reduction in gallons of gasoline is 
realized 
5% if 10% reduction in gallons of gasoline is 
realized 
5% 4. Assist with training of two welders " " - t0 a 
assure certification in electric arc welding by 
September 30. 1987. Certification qualification 
to be done by Northern Engineering and Testing Lab­
oratories as specified in A.P.I. 1104. 
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5% 5. Develop good working relationship and open communications 
with Distribution -Foreman 
a. Inform foreman of Company's and superintendents expec­
tations before August 1. 1987 
b. Have distribution foreman meet with superintendent 
each Friday afternoon at 4.15 with tentative work 
schedule for following week. 
c. Foreman to spend at least I hour per day in the office 
planning the following days work schedule, com­
plete paper work, stores issue sheets, arrange 
utility locations, and answer requests of Fran or 
Marylou. 
d. Foreman to plan main renewal projects on week in 
advance of scheduling work. Hold a 15 min pre-con 
meeting Friday morning with construction person­
nel to discuss project and receive input. 
e. Work with superintendent to improve planning 
abilities. Superintendent to submit quarterly re­
port to president on general foreman's progress in 
getting work distributed by 4:30 previous day and 
general overview of 4:15 planning improvements. 
100% if 40 leads convert to new gas appliance sales 
50% if 25 leads convert to new gas appliance sales 
35% if 15 leads convert to new gas appliance sales 
5% 7. Rewrite performance standards of subordinates to be re­
sults oriented. 
5% 6. Increase sales by marketing leads. 
5% if 100% are rewritten 
3% if 75% are rewritten 
2% if 50% are rewritten 




F1988 SPEC J FIC OBJECTIVES 
FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGER 
August 10, 1987 
I. FURTHER IMPROVE CUSTOMER SERVICE 
Customer service superiority will be improved when we recognize that 
customer relations mirror employee relations. To this extent, Human 
Resources will focus its attention on management and front-line supervi­
sors to provide training in supportive skills which should build abili­
ties of effective management. 
A. Each manager and supervisor will be trained on how to conduct more 
effective performance appraisals by the end of F1988. 
35% Measurable Specific Objective: Halo effect of performance 
evaluations to be held at F1987 levels (4.01) or below: 
*100% earned if average ratings are below 3.86 
* 95% earned if average ratings are 3.87 - 3.89 
* 90% earned if average ratings are 3.90 - 3.92 
* 85% earned if average ratings are 3.93 - 3.95 
* 80% earned if average ratings are 3.96 - 3.98 
* 75% earned if average ratings are 3.99 - 4.01 
B. A more effective performance appraisal system for the Service Center 
union personnel will be developed. Job standards will be geared 
more to measurable objectives. This will be completed by June 1, 
1988. 
5% Measurable Specific Objective: Twenty positions completed; 
*5% earned if 15 - 20 positions are completed 
*3% earned if 10 - 15 positions are completed 
*2% earned if 5 - 10 positions are completed 
*0% earned if less than 5 positions are completed 
C. An on-going training program coordinated to include managers in the 
training process will continue for first level supervisors to 
develop skills in: 
Communications - October, 1987 
Delegation - December, 1987 
Reward-Discipline - January, 1988 
Time Management - March, 1988 
Other areas as needed. 
97 
10% Measurable Specific Objective: After productivity training, 
managers should be able to 'cut payroll budgets by 10%. The Human 
Resource Department will lead by example. 
*10% earned if payroll budget is cut more than $1644 
* 9% earned if payroll budget is cut $1534-$1643 
* 8% earned if payroll budget is cut $1423-$1533 
* 7% earned if payroll budget is cut $1312-$1422 
* 6% earned if payroll budget is cut $1201-$1311 
* 5% earned if payroll budget is cut under $1200 
D Provide input from employee developmental plans to design overall 
training programs, in cooperation with the Training Task Force. To 
be completed by September, 1987. 
PROVIDE MORE CHALLENGING AND REWARDING WORK FOR EACH EMPLOYEE 
•Job enrichment and challenging employees' creativity will be enhanced as 
position descriptions more closely resemble actual duties. These duties 
must carry realistic job standards to measure productivity. 
A. Job standards for each non-union, non-exempt employee will be devel­
oped to reflect at least three new measurements for each position. 
Managers, supervisors, and employees will be involved in the process 
to reflect effective and measurable criteria in order to make intel­
ligent evaluations. At the same time, job descriptions will be re 
viewed to recommend changes in major responsibilities. Standards 
are to be upgraded by June 30, 1988. 
15% Measurable Specific Objective: 
*15% earned if 116 - 125 new measurements 
*14% earned if 106 - 115 new measurements 
*13% earned if 96 - 105 new measurements 
*12% earned if 86 - 95 new measurements 
*11% earned if 76 - 85 new measurements 
* 0% earned if less than 75 new measurements 
0. Reduce employee absenteeism by 20% from F1987 records. This is re­
corded absence for illness or doctor hours five days of less in 
duration. 
5% Measurable Specific Objective: 
*5% earned if absenteeism is reduced by 20% 
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C. The F1988 Wage and Salary Program will be announced to the employees 
by June 24, 1987. This includes an explanation of the salary survey 
conducted, the six point evaluation criteria, and the pay-for-
performance grid. Emphasis will be stressed that merit is the key 
to raises. An on-going individual plant will continue to show em­
ployees exactly where they placed in the survey, and also the poten­
tial for raises under the new grid. A guideline for managers on how 
to justify exceptional and outstanding performers will be issued by 
July 31, 1987. A monitoring system for the salary program to con­
tinuously record the following will be developed: 
BASE $ % 
DATE DEPI EMPLOYEE WAGE INCREASE INCREASE RATINGS 
Total: 
This system will allow senior management to monitor wage increases 
quarterly. Completion date is September 30, 1987. 
III. SELL MORE GAS 
In concert with the Marketing Department, develop and implement an Em­
ployee Incentive Plan to encourage maximum participation. 
A. Submit leads for new (or converted) gas appliances which result in 
ten such actual appliance sales. 
10% Measurable Specific Objective: 
*100% earned if ten appliances are sold. 
Both employee and supervisor have agreed to the above objectives on this 
of 1987. 
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SIJF^RVISOR - FISCAl '.9R3 - INCENTIVE PLAN 
DISTRIBUTION FOREMAN 
75% of the incentive bonus will be based on specific 
objectives. 25% of the incentive plan will be based 
upon the company's overall performance (R.O.E.) 
10% of bonus will be achieved when a typed detailed 
construction report for main renewals is prioritized 
and time table with estimated starting dates has been 
submitted on or before April 1, 1988. 
Reduction of temporary laborer payroll costs. By 
scheduling temporary employee hiring to coincide with 
peak work load periods. 
REDUCTION Raw salary's costs 
100% 30% $15,000 
50% 20% 10,500 
25% 10% 5,500 
10% 5% 2,700 
15% 3. Reduce regular payroll costs by improved productivity and 
planning. 
50% This goal will be satisfied when the "next days scheduled 
work is distributed to the crews prior to 4:30 p.m. 
50% Also provide fill in work log for personnel when assigned 
jobs have been completed ahead of scheduled or have 
been cancelled, and you are not available. Copy of log 
submitted to superintendent monthly indicating fill jobs, 
completion dates, and signatures. 
15% 4 Reduce overall service line installation costs by reducing 
the average payroll unit cost per service as calculated 





REDUCTION OF AVERAGE PAYROLL UNIT COSTS 
5% S2.00 
10% 5.00 
15% 10 00 
10% 5. Reduce 300 account installation average unit costs per 
service stub. 
REDUCTION OF AVERAGE PAYROLL UNIT COST 
5% 1.00 
10% 3.00 
10% 6. Increased sales by marketing leads. 
100% if 6 leads convert to new gas appliance 
sales. 
50% if 3 leads convert to new gas appliance 
sales 
35% if 2 leads convert to new gas appliance 
sales. 
Date Human Resource Manager Date President 
Approved/ 
disapproved 
Approved ̂  
Disapproved 
E M P L O Y E E  
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APPENDIX 6A 
S t i  A m e r i c a n  G a s  
e a  A s s o c i a t i o n  
l 51 5 Wilson Boulevard. Arlington, Va. 22209 
1 elcphor.e (703J 311-8073 
MichacI I. German 
A u g u s t  1 ,  1 9 3 7  
Vice President 
Planning and Analysis 
D e a r  PJCTICIp a n C 
T h e  1 9 3 7  A m e r i c a n  G a s  A s s o c i a t i o n  C o m p e n s a t i o n  S u r v e y s  
r c  f l e e t  a  n u m b e r  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  c h a n g e s  f r o m  p r i o r  s u r v e y s .  
T h e  C o m p e n s a t i o n  &  B e n e f i t s  C o m m i t t e e ,  t l \ e  s t a f f  o f  A . G . A .  
a n d  t h e  c o n s u l t a n t s  o f  M e r c e r - M e i d i n g e r - H a n s e n  h a v e  c o m b i n e d  
t h e i r  e f f o r t s  t o  i m p r o v e  t h e  c o m p r e h e n s i v e n e s s ,  q u a l i t y  a n d  
t i m e l i n e s s  o f  t h e  s u r v e y s .  W e  t r u s t  t h a t  y o u  w i l l  f i n d  t h e  
r e s u l t s  m o r e  u s e f u l  a n d  r e l i a b l e .  
T h e  s u r v e y  t h i s  y e a r  c o n t a i n s  f o u r  s e c t i o n s .  T h o s e  i n  w h i c h  
y o u  h a v e  p a r t i c i p a t e d  a r e  i n c l u d e d ,  o r  w i l l  b e  f o r w a r d e d  t o  
y o u  s h o r t l y .  T h e  s e c t i o n s  a n d  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  f i r m s  
p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  e a c h  a r e :  
All of the data is effective as of Macch 1, 1907. The 
introduction to each acccion clarifies the way that the data 
is presented. Please take the time to cead these 
clari f icat ions. 
The formats have been developed to maximize the celevance of 
the analysis and protect the confidentiality of the 
participant data. Whece data .nay have allowed individual 
company information to be identified, the data ha3 not been 
shown. We also want to remind you that »very participant 
has signed an agreement to tceat the results of this survey 
confidentially. 
A data listing of youc ficra's position matches to the survey 
positions is enclosed foe your referenca. If some of your 
initial position responsas were not included in the survey, 
it means that the Mercer Consultants did not believe that 
the data submitted met theic comfort level foe degree of 
match. This should not necessarily preclude you from 
deciding the match is appropriate for your purposes. 
While we believe major improvements have been made in this 
year's survey, the need for numerous other format 
improvements has become evident as we implemented our plans. 
Youc support in the form of comments and recommendations is 
necessary to make next year's survey even better. 
C o r p o r a t e  l l o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s  
E x e c u t  i v e  
M a n a g e r i a l ,  S u p e r v i s o r y  a n d  P r o f e s s i o n a l  
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  P o l i c i e s  
3 7  
9 5  
9 9  
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A u g  u s e  1 ,  1 9 8 7  
Page Two 
l a  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e  y o u  u i  L L  r e c e i v e  a  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  a s k i n g  
C o r  y o u r  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h i s  y e a r ' s  s u r v e y  a n d  w h a t  i s  n e e d e d  
C o r  n e x t  y e a r .  W e  a r e  a l s o  p l a n n i n g  a  m e e t i n g  i n  O r l a n d o ,  
F l o c i d a  o n  O c t o b e r  1 5 t h  t o  d e v e l o p  p l a n s  f o r  n e x t  y e a r ' s  
s u r v e y .  Y o u  a r e  i n v i t e d  t o  a t t e n d .  
I C  y o u  h a v e  a n y  q u e s t i o n s  o n  t h e  s u r v e y  p r o c e s s  p l e a s e  
c o n t a c t  P a t  C u r l e y  a t  A . G . A .  (  7 0  3 / 3 4  1  - 3 - 1 9 7  ) .  Q u e s t i o n s  o n  
s p e c i f i c  p o s i t i o n  i n C o r m a t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  d i r e c t e d  t o  H o y t  
D o y e l  o r  B a r b a r a  M a r k o v e t z  a t  M o r c e r - M e i d i n q e r - i U n s e n  ( 3 0 3 /  
0 3 1 - 7 1 0 0 ) .  
W o  a p p r e c i a t e  y o u r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  g r o u p  s u r v e y s  a n d  
l o o k  C o r w a r d  t o  s e r v i n g  y o u  i r ,  t h e  f u t u r e .  
S i n c e c e l y ,  
Michael 1. G 
Enclosures 
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1 9 8 7  E X E C U T I V E  C O M P E N S A T I O N  
S U R V E Y  R E S U L T S  
Copyright/ 1987 
by the American Gas Association 
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Table  II  
INCENTIVE PLAN ANALYSIS 
All Firms 
Eflgltton Title 
901 Chief Executive Officer 
902 Chief Operating Officer 
903 Executive Vice President 
960 Top Exploration and Production Executive 
928 Top Legal Executive 
912 Top Financial Executive 
910 Top Administrative Executive 
950 Top Operations Executive 
956 Top Gas Supply Executive 
914 Controller 
926 Top Human Resources Executive 
916 Treasurer 
940 Top Marketing Executive 
934 Top Rate Executive 
938 Top Governmental Affairs Executive 
930 Secretary - Legal 
952 Division Operations Executive 
954 Top Engineering Executive 
936 Top Public Relations. Executive 
922 Top D.P./M.I.S. Executive 
932 Secretary - Non-Legal 
918 Top Tax Executive 
924 Top Purchasing Executive 
920 Top Internal Auditor 
Coroorate Subsidiaries 
Avg Avg Avg Avg 
mum* Maximum 7- Eligible Target % Maximum '/. 
39 '/. 29% 475C 57% 27% 40% 
49 22 32 61 25 4 3 
22 21 25 NS - -
46 22 45 Combined vl th Corp. 
46 20 33 67 19 32 
42 20 32 59 19 '34 
43 15 25 67 20 44 
39 19 29 Combined with Corp. 
43 17 30 Combined with Corp. 
37 19 37 73 17 33 
38 16 29 56 16 32 
36 16 28 54 16 2 8 
39 17 31 Combined with Corp. 
43 14 27 Combined with Corp. 
38 19 35 Combined with Corp. 
60 14 25 NS - -
46 18 29 Combined with Corp 
33 17 26 Combined with Corp 
29 15 27 Combined wl th Corp 
24 16 26 35 16 2 7  
34 18 31 NS - -
31 15 27 13 4 -
14 18 29 25 4 5  
22 14 25 25 2 0  2 5  
NS = Insufficient data for analysis 
Table C 
INCENTIVE PLAN CHARACTERISTICS 
PERCENT Of EMPLOYEES ELIGIBLE FOR PROGRAMS 










la) (5_i_Ia) JLifi 
ISO • Incentive Stock Options 
NQ • Non-Qualified 
RS • Restricted Stock 
SAR • Stock Appreciation Rights 
P1«n« Stock Incentive Plan; Cash Incentive Plan; Stock loCQfUivo r \  
afi as SA5 
Short- Mid- Long-
Term Tera Term 
Other (Annual 1 (2-4 Yrs) (5 * Yrs) ISO HQ Si iAB Other 
901 Chief Exec. Off. 32X 4  % n 24X 21X 13% 15*  sr. 50X 14X ox  86X 79X 29X 2IX OX 
902  Chief Op. Off. Pres. 34 3  3  14  11  14  11  3  57  < 13 52 65 39 26 13 
903 Exec. V.  P. 17 11  0  39  11  11  17  6  Insuf f ici ent data 
960 Top Expl. k Prod. Exec. 38 0  53  31  31  15  15  Combi ned vi th corporate 
928 Top Legal Exec. 36 5  8  31  21  13  18  5  67  7  0 47 53 20 27 7 
912 Top Fin. Exec. 28 5  7  23  20  12  12  7  S3  12  0 59 53 29 13 0 
910 Top Adm. Exec. 22 4  4  17  9  0  4 4 50 0  0 33 33 33 16 0 
950 Top Opr. Exee. 29 4  4  25  17  8  9  3  Combined wi th corpora te 
95$ Top Gas Supply Exec. 37 4  2  31  27  10  14 0 Combined with corporate 
914  Controller 28  7  2  20  15  9  17  7  54 A 0 50 S4 15 23 8 
926 Top H. R. Exec. 32 2  8  21  17  8 11 6  56  4 0 36 4B 16 16 A 
916 Treasurer 29 2  7  22  20  9  18  7  46  e  0  77 46 0 0 0  
940  Top Mktg Exec. 35 3  3  29  2 )  9  12  3  Combi ned wi th corpora te 
934 Top Rate Exec. 36 5  3  25  26  10  13  2  Combi ned wi th corpora to 
938 Top Gov. Affairs Exec. 35 3  3  30  35  15  20  5  Combined with corporate 
930 Seer. - Legal 40 0 40 20  10  20  0  Insufficient data 
952 Oiv. Opr. Exec. 47 2  3  33  25  5  7 10 Combi ned wi th corpora te 
954 Top Engr. Exee. 27 2  2  21  13  5  10  2  Combi ned wi th corporate 
936  Top P. R. Exee. 23 3  0  23  16  3  10  3  Combi ned with corporate 
922 Top D.P./M.I.S. Exec. 20 2  6  14  12  6  4 4 30  5  0  45 30 0  20 0 
932  Seer. - Non-Legal 28 3  7  21  24  10  17  10  Insufficient data 
13 918 Top Tax Exee. 28 3  0  19  13  6  9  6  13  0  0  25 25 0 0 
924  Top Purch. Exee. 8  3  0  3  0  3  3  3  13  0  0  13 13 0 6 0 
920  Top Internal Aud. 15 2 0  13  9  7  7  4 38 13  0  25 25 0 
13 0 
APPENDIX -4B 
Ame:'ic2P. Gsa ;01S V,'ih:o:t Boulevard. Arlington. Vn. 2220S 
Ass00;.~ii0n ":-:jp l~or.o.(.'03) 8 <: 1 -83 7 3 
Michael I. German 
V'ir.o 
January' 20, 1988 
Dear Participant: 
Subject: Smaller Company Compensation Survey 
The Compensation & Benefits Committee and the staff of 
A.G.A. have worked together to produce a special edition of 
our compensation for smaller companies survey. This special 
edition is tailored for companies whose gross annual 
revenues are in the 0-500 million size range. We trust that 
you will find the results useful and reliable. 
The special edition contains three sections. Those in which 
you have participated are included, or will be forwarded to 
you shortly. The sections and the number of firms 
participating in each are: 
Executive 69 
Managerial, Supervisory and Professional 66 
Administrative Policies 71 
All of the data is effective as of March 1, 1987. The 
introduction to each section clarifies the way that the data 
is presented. 
The formats have been developed to maximize the relevance of 
the analysis and protect the confidentiality of the 
participant data. Where data may have allowed individual 
company information to be identified, the data has not been 
shown. We also want to remind you that every participant 
has signed an agreement to treat the results of this survey 
confidentially. 
A data listing of your firm's position matches to the survey 
positions is enclosed .for .your reference. If some of your 
initial position responses were not included in the survey, 
it means that the Mercer Consultants did not believe that 
the data submitted met their comfort level for degree of 
match. This should not necessarily preclude you from 
deciding the match is appropriate for your purposes. 
108 
January 20, 1908 
Page Two 
If you have any questions on the survey process please 
contact Pat Curley at A G A (703/841-8497). We appreciate 
your participation in the group surveys and look forward to 
serving you in the future 




INCENTIVE PLAN ANALYSIS 
All Firms 
A Avg Avg 
Position Title Eligible Target % Maximum 
901 Chief Executive Officer 382 152 26% 
902 Chief Operating Officer 46 13 23 
910 Top Administrative Executive 43 9 20 
928 Top Legal Executive 4o 14 27 
912 Top Financial Executive 35 13 22 
903 Executive Vice President 33 0 20 
960 Top Exploration and Production 
Executive 40 13 25 
956 Top Gas Supply Executive 16 11 20 
950 Top Operations Executive 37 11 18 
9^0 Top Marketing Executive 27 11 17 
930 Secretary - Legal 67 3 13 
91^ Controller .37 10 27 
931 Top Rate Executive 33 11 15 
926 Top Human Resources Executive 26 12 19 
922 Top D.P./M.I.S. Executive 21 12 16 
952 Division Operations Executive 26 9 13 
95*< Top Engineering Executive 24 10 12 
916 Treasurer 29 10 18 
936 Top Public Relations Executive 25 10 16 
938 Top Governmental Affairs 
Executive 17 13 11 
918 Top Tax Executive 25 8 11 
932 Secretary - Non-Legal 32 4 13 
92̂  Top Purchasing Executive 6 NIP NIP 
920 Top Internal Auditor 17 6 11 




PERCENT OF EMPLOYEE 
Position Title 
901 Chief Executive Officer 
902 Chief Operating Officer 
910 Top Administrative Executive 
928 Top Legal Executive 
912 Top Financial Executive 
903 Executive Vice President 
9b0 Top Exploration and Production 
Executive 
956 Top Gas Supply Executive 
950 Top Operations Executive 
9'l0 Top Marketing Executive 
930 Secretary - Legal 
91'l Controller 
93'' Top Rate Executive 
926 Top Human Resources Executive 
922 Top D.P./M.I.S. Executive 
952 Division Operations Executive 
954 Top Engineering Executive 
916 Treasurer 
936 Top Public Relations Executive 
938 Top Governmental Affairs 
Executive 
918 Top Tax Executive 
932 Secretary - Non-Legal 
924 Top Purchasing Executive 
920 Top Internal Auditor 
CHARACTERISTICS 
ELIGIBLE FOR PROGRAMS 
Cash Stock 
Incentive Plans Incentive Plans 
Short- Mic- Long-
re rm Tcra Term ISO NQ RS SAR 1 Other 
30? 52 62 252 172 82 82 22 
29 3 9 9 14 6 3 11 
22 0 9 22 17 4 9 4 
28 S 8 20 12 8 4 4 
22 4 6 18' 12 6 4 2 
0 0 0 33 0 0 0 0 
40 0 0 40 20 20 0 0 
38 8 4 17 8 8 8 0 
23 3 3 12 8 3 3 2 
22 2 4 18 4 4 4 2 
33 0 0 33 0 0 0 0 
20 7 2 10 7 5 5 7 
24 6 3 9 6 3 6 0 
22 4 7 13 9 4 4 4 
19 4 6 11 9 0 2 2 
28 2 0 4 4 7 4 0 
17 0 2 10 5 7 5 0 
21 6 9 24 12 3 6 6 
19 3 0 8 3 3 3 0 
17 0 0 8 8 8 17 0 
25 6 0 13 6 6 13 0 
21 0 5 21 5 11 11 0 
3 0 0 3 0 3 3 0 
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